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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The military has historically had a problem with retaining aviators.  This has been 
primarily due to the draw of the commercial airline industry and the monetary incentives 
offered by that industry.  In order to stem the flow of aviators into the commercial sector, 
the military introduced the Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) program as the primary tool 
to increase retention among mid-career aviators.  ACP has been relatively successful at 
enabling the services to maintain an appropriate number of mid-career aviators.  
However, the success of the ACP program as a retention tool has not been demonstrated 
in wartime. 
Prior to the Global War on Terror, the Marine Corps deployment schedule was 
relatively stable with an aviator expecting to deploy six out of every 32 months.  The 
stability of the deployment schedule allowed Marines to plan for deployments and limited 
the amount of flexibility required by an individual Marine.  The operational stability also 
allowed for a more stable home life for Marines, which positively affected both the 
morale of the Marines as well as that of their families.  
Since September 11, 2001, however, the United States has been engaged in 
combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the Global War on Terror.  Because 
of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and 
deployment tempo have increased dramatically.  Today a Marine aviator can expect to be 
deployed seven out of every fourteen months.  These frequent and lengthy deployments 
are difficult for both Marines and families.  The increased OPTEMPO has caused many 
Marines to take a hard look at the impact the Marine Corps lifestyle has on their personal 
lives. 
In order to determine whether the current retention tools needed to be reviewed, a 
new study of the retention of Marine aviators post-9/11/2001 is necessary.  The Marine 
Corps will be able to take the results of this study and determine if it needs to be  
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concerned with the retention of these aviators.  This information will be helpful to 
decision making in determining whether to adjust the current ACP program or to look for 
other programs to improve retention of Marine aviators. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Marine Corps Aviation 
a. Marine Corps Aviator Training 
Marine Corps aviation consists of both pilots and naval flight officers.  
After commissioning, all Marine Corps officers complete a six-month training program 
called The Basic School at Marine Corps Base (MCB) Quantico, VA.  Following 
completion of The Basic School, all officers selected for the naval aviator and naval 
flight officer programs are sent to NAS Pensacola, FL, for flight training. 
All aviation candidates begin training with a six-week Aviation Preflight 
Indoctrination (API) course.  This course teaches the students the basics of aerodynamics, 
navigation, and aircraft engines.(Chief of Naval Air Training 2)  Following API, the 
students begin their specific training as either a Student Naval Aviator or Student Naval 
Flight Officer. 
Student Naval Aviators (SNAs) receive training in one of three locations: 
Naval Air Station (NAS) Whiting Field, FL; NAS Corpus Christi, TX; or Vance Air 
Force Base (AFB), OK.  SNAs receive 22 weeks of Primary Flight Training during which 
time the students are instructed in flying single engine airplanes.(Chief of Naval Air 
Training 2)  Following completion of this training, SNAs determine which type of 
aircraft they want to fly; choosing between Strike (Jet), Multi-Engine Propeller, or 
Helicopters.(Chief of Naval Air Training 2)   
The SNAs selecting Strike (Jet) training report to either NAS Kingsville, 
TX, or NAS Meridian, MS, for Intermediate and Advanced Flight Training.(Chief of 
Naval Air Training 2)  This training lasts approximately one year, at the end of which the 
SNA receives his “wings of gold” and is designated as a Restricted Naval Aviator.  At 
this time, the newly winged pilot selects a specific platform: the AV-8B Harrier, F/A-18 
Hornet, or EA-6B Prowler.   
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After selecting a platform, the new pilot will report to the Fleet 
Replacement Squadron (FRS) for platform-specific training.  This training lasts six 
months to one year.  At the completion of training, the pilot is designated as an AV-8B, 
F/A-18, or EA-6B pilot and is sent to his first Fleet Marine Force (FMF) squadron.  At 
the squadron, the pilot continues training in order to receive mission qualifications, which 
allow the pilot to deploy with the squadron. 
The SNAs selected for Multi-Engine Propeller training receive 
Intermediate Flight Training at their Primary Flight Training Squadron for approximately 
six weeks, then report to NAS Corpus Christi for Advanced Flight Training.(Chief of 
Naval Air Training 2)  Advanced Flight Training lasts approximately six months, at the 
completion of which,  SNAs are designated Restricted Naval Aviators and are sent to the 
C-130 Hercules FRS in Georgia for platform specific training.  At the completion of this 
training, the new C-130 pilots report to FMF squadrons for advanced training.  At the 
squadron, these pilots receive training until designated fully combat qualified, at which 
time, they are considered eligible for deployment. 
The SNAs selected for Helicopter training receive Intermediate Flight 
Training at their Primary Flight Training Squadron for approximately six weeks.  
Following completion of Intermediate Flight Training, the SNAs report to NAS Whiting 
Field in order to begin Advanced Flight Training.(Chief of Naval Air Training 2)  After 
approximately six months of training, the SNAs are designated Unrestricted Naval 
Aviators and select platforms: AH-1W Cobra, UH-1N Huey, CH-46E Sea Knight, CH-
53D Sea Stallion, or CH-53E Sea Stallion.  At this time, pilots report to the appropriate 
FRS for platform specific training.  Once this training is complete, they will report to 
FMF squadrons for further training.  Once properly trained and designated as fully 
combat capable, they are eligible to deploy. 
After API, all Student Naval Flight Officers (SNFOs) remain at NAS 
Pensacola for Primary Flight Training.  During Primary Flight Training, the SNFOs learn 
the basics of flying as well as navigation.  Upon completion of Primary Flight Training, 
SNFOs select either Tactical Jet or Strike training.  These SNFOs receive Intermediate 
Flight Training at NAS Pensacola and then split up for Advanced Flight Training.   
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Those selecting Tactical Jet remain at NAS Pensacola for Advanced Flight 
Training.  Those who select Strike report to Corry Station, FL, for Electronic Warfare 
Training.(Chief of Naval Air Training 2)  At the completion of either Advanced Flight 
Training or Electronic Warfare Training, the SNFOs are designated as either Weapons 
Systems Officers (WSOs) for the F/A-18 Hornet or Electronic Counter-Measures 
Officers (ECMOs) for the EA-6B Prowler.  After designation, these officers report to 
their respective FRS’s for platform-specific training.  At the completion of this training, 
the officers report to FMF squadrons for training.  Once they are designated as fully 
combat capable, they are eligible for deployment. 
Marine Corps Aviators endure an extensive training program, which 
begins with six-months of training at The Basic School.  After The Basic School, a pilot 
can expect to spend between two and three years in flight school, while an NFO spends 
twelve to eighteen months.  For naval aviators/flight officers, training continues for 
another one to two years before they are ready to deploy.  At this time, the Marine Corps 
has made a large financial investment and is ready to receive its payback. 
b. Marine Corps Aviation Active Duty Service Obligation 
The Active Duty Service Obligation (ADSO) for Pilots and NFOs is 
different from other Marine Officers.  The typical Marine Officer has an ADSO of four 
years after commissioning, or five years for Service Academy graduates.  This 
commitment begins the day that the Marine reports to The Basic School.  Marine 
Pilots/NFOs have a much greater ADSO, which does not begin until after the completion 
of flight school and designation as Naval Aviators or Naval Flight Officers. 
Prior to 1978, the ADSO for pilots was 3.5 years and 3 years for NFOs.  
This would make the total commitment for these officers approximately equal to that of 
ground officers.  This length of service commitment has been adjusted four times since 
1978.  The reason for adjusting the ADSO is because the Marine Corps recognizes the 
value of the training these officers receive as well as the value of the experience that 




experience is through time in a squadron. Due to the length of training, the Marine Corps 
did not get the same amount of experience from aviators as it did from ground officers at 
the expiration of ADSO.  
In 1978, the ADSO changed to a four-year obligation.  In 1981 and 1989, 
the ADSO changed again, to mandate an obligated service length of 4.5 and 5 years 
respectively.  Then in 1990, the Marine Corps realized the true value of these officers and 
adjusted the ADSO for a final time.  Since this change in 1990, all jet pilots have an 
ADSO of eight years after receiving their wings, and all multi-engine propeller pilots, 
helicopter pilots, and naval flight officers have an ADSO of six years after receiving their 
wings. 
The change in length of ADSO was a necessity for the Marine Corps.  
Pilots and NFOs receive training that is not only valuable to the military, but also 
valuable to the civilian airline industry as well.  With shorter ADSOs, individuals were 
essentially encouraged to use the military to pay for expensive flight training as well as 
experience with no vested interest in the service.  As a result, many pilots separated in 
order to pursue careers in the commercial airline industry.  Many of these pilots had 
served less than eight years of active service and had obtained valuable experience.  
When faced with the knowledge of twelve more years of service (in order to receive a 
pension), more deployments, and relatively low pay, many of these officers took 
advantage of the training and experience received, and separated from the Marine Corps. 
The current length of the ADSO for pilots and naval flight officers, 
enhances the draw of investiture in the military.  Jet pilots, who are the most marketable 
to the civilian airline industry, are obligated to serve eight years after completing flight 
school.  When time-to-train is taken into account, jet pilots will have eleven or twelve 
years of service at the end of their obligated service.  The vestment of the pension is 
much greater when an individual is “over the hump” and more than halfway to 
retirement. 
Multi-engine propeller or and helicopter pilots face a similarly difficult 
decision.  With the current ADSO at six years, these pilots will have nine or ten years of 
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commissioned service at the completion of their obligation.  At this point, the lure of 
vestment is stronger than it had been under previous ADSOs, and more individuals will 
consider continuing service as the best career decision. 
The Active Duty Service Obligation has changed over the years in order to 
meet the needs of the Marine Corps.  The Corps cannot afford to lose officers that it has 
spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to train.  Because of the nature of the general 
training that pilots and naval flight officers receive, they are in demand by the civilian 
sector.  The Marine Corps has had to accept that reality and make changes in order to 
retain these individuals.  One method of increasing retention has been to increase the 
Active Duty Service Obligation. 
c. Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) 
Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) was first introduced enacted into law in 
1989 with the passing of Title 37 U.S. Code Section 301B.  This law was enacted in order 
to “provide a proactive, long-term aviation career incentive for…aviation field grade 
officers.”(CMC MPP 1995)  The Marine Corps first made use of ACP in Fiscal Year 
(FY) 1990 and has continued offering it since that time.   The initial offering of ACP was 
for a short-term contract (two years) which did not necessarily help the Marine Corps to 
meet the ACP goal of providing a “long-term aviation career incentive.”(CMC MPP 
1995, )  The two-year contract only served to meet short-term needs, not long-term needs. 
From FY1990 through FY1996, the Marine Corps used ACP in order to 
get an additional two years of service out of its pilots.  After FY1996, the Marine Corps 
realized it was not utilizing ACP to its fullest and modified the program.  In FY1997, the 
Marine Corps increased the ACP obligation in order to retain aviators through 14 years of 
service.  Aviators were eligible for ACP if they were below the rank of Lieutenant 
Colonel, were “qualified to perform operational flying duty, had completed any active 
duty service commitment incurred from undergraduate aviator training, and had 
completed at least six years, but less than 13 years of active duty.”(CMC MPP 1997, )  
The requirement was “to remain on active duty to complete 14 Years of Commissioned 
Service (YCS).”(CMC MPP 1997, )  In return for this increased service commitment, the 
aviator would receive an ACP payment of $12,000 annually.  The monetary incentive 
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was intended to balance out the inequity between civilian aviator pay and military aviator 
pay.  The theory is that money is the most productive incentive and that aviators will 
respond to this monetary incentive.   
The ACP for FY1997 included two “critical” Military Occupational 
Specialties (MOS’s), but in future years the Marine Corps expand the program by 
designating all aviation MOS’s as “critical.”  Other changes have occurred since FY1997, 
with respect to ACP.   
In FY2001, the Marine Corps realized that the previous programs were not 
helping it to meet the goal of being a “long-term aviation career incentive”(CMC MPP 
1995, ) and determined to make the necessary changes.  FY2001 ACP extended the 
required length of service to 16 years for Majors and 21 years for Lieutenant 
Colonels.(CMC MPP 2000, )  It also created a short-term contract and a long-term 
contract.  The short-term contract required the aviator to remain in service for a three-
year period (“unless the officer has less than three years remaining to complete 16 
YCS”(CMC MPP 2000, )) and was offered to both Majors and Lieutenant Colonels (who 
were committed to 21 YCS).   The long-term contract was offered only to Majors who 
were willing to agree to serve until 16 YCS.(CMC MPP 2000, )  The monetary incentive 
varied between the short-term and long-term contracts, and it also varied between the 
types of aircraft flown.  Fixed-Wing pilots received a higher incentive than Rotary-Wing 
Pilots and Naval Flight Officers.  The Fixed-Wing payment was $18,000 per year for the 
short-term contract and $25,000 per year for the long-term contract.  While all other 
aviators received $9,000 per year in the short-term, and $12,000 per year in the long-
term.(CMC MPP 2000, ) 
ACP remained unchanged between FY2001 and FY2003.  The Marine 
Corps believed that ACP was successfully enabling it to retain the appropriate number of 
aviators, and that some communities were even retaining too many officers.  In FY2004, 
the Marine Corps changed ACP by reducing the amounts offered annually to Rotary 
Wing Pilots and Naval Flight Officers.(CMC MPP 2003)  FY2005 saw another change to 
ACP, with Lieutenant Colonels no longer qualifying for the bonus.(CMC MPP 2004)  
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These changes were undertaken because of a belief that retention was high and that the 
Corps had more field-grade aviators than it needed.   
The intent behind ACP is to entice aviators to remain in the Marine Corps 
for a career.  At the time that ACP was initiated, all of the services were suffering from a 
shortage of senior leadership in their respective aviation communities, particularly with 
field-grade officers (Majors and Lieutenant Colonel).  More and more aviators were 
leaving the service because of the enticement of better pay in the civilian airline industry.  
As long as the airlines were hiring, aviators would be leaving.  The services determined 
that the best incentive to retain aviators was a monetary incentive, such as ACP.  This 
incentive would serve to offset the imbalance between civilian aviator pay and military 
aviator pay.  It is not possible for the military to completely equalize aviator pay with 
their civilian counterparts, so it is acknowledged that there will be a number of pilots 
separating in order to pursue more money in the civilian sector. The goal of ACP is to 
entice those aviators who are “on the fence” and enjoy military service, but are 
considering options in the civilian marketplace.   
ACP has been successful in meeting the needs of the services by enticing 
aviators to remain, but the times have changed.  When ACP was enacted, the United 
States was not at war.  Since then, the United States has entered into the Global War on 
Terror, with direct combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, and increasing deployment tempo.  
While ACP was successful during peacetime, the question remains “will it be successful 
during a time of war?” 
2. Personnel and Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) 
The Fiscal Year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act defined Personnel 
Tempo (PERSTEMPO) and Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) for the Department of 
Defense.  The reason for these definitions is to limit the deployed time for soldiers, 
sailors, airmen, and Marines on active duty.  In 1999 when this legislature was passed, 
the military was active in Bosnia, Kosovo, Africa, and other places throughout the world.  
At the time, the military appeared to be stretching itself too thin. With the Global War on 
Terror, this belief has turned into a reality.  Because of this, it is necessary to understand 
the definitions of Personnel Tempo and Operational Tempo as legislated. 
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Personnel Tempo is defined as “the amount of time members of the armed forces 
are engaged in their official duties, including official duties at a location or under 
circumstances that make it infeasible for members to spend off-duty time in the housing 
in which the member resides when on garrison duty at the member’s permanent duty 
station.”(CMC MPO-40 2000b)  This definition of Personnel Tempo is meant for the 
individual Marine.  It requires that the Marine Corps, as well as the other services, keep 
record of deployed days for each individual Marine.   
In 2000, the Commandant of the Marine Corps gave further guidance with respect 
to PERSTEMPO.  This guidance covers a four-year period for each Marine.  The 
Commandant’s guidance states that: 
A.  Marines cannot deploy or remain deployed more than 182 days of the 
preceding 365 days without the approval of the first General Officer in their chain of 
command. 
B.  Marines assigned to a Combatant Command cannot deploy or remain 
deployed more than 220 days of the preceding 365 days without approval from their 
respective Marine Corps Component Commander (COMMARFORPAC or 
COMMARFORLANT). 
C.  Marines not assigned to a Combatant Command cannot deploy or 
remain deployed more than 220 days of the preceding 365 days without approval from 
CMC, ACMC, or the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC 
M&RA) 
D.  Marines deployed more than 400 days of the preceding 730 days rate 
high deployment per diem payments of $100 per day beginning on the 401st day. 
E.  SECNAV (Secretary of the Navy) may suspend the applicability of the 
above mandates when it is determined that such a waiver is necessary in the national 
interests of the United States.  (CMC MPO-40 2000a) 
The FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act defines Operational Tempo as 
“the rate at which units of the armed forces are involved in all military activities, 
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including contingency operations, exercises, and training deployments.”(CMC MPO-40 
2000b)  This definition does not apply to the individual, it applies at the unit level.  This 
requires the Marine Corps, as well as the other services, to track all unit-level 
deployments. 
3. Retention 
Retention has always been a concern for the aviation community.  Many military 
pilots have succumbed to the lure of the big paycheck and stable lifestyle offered by the 
civilian airlines.  The civilian airlines are in sharp contrast to the military, which offers a 
relatively smaller monetary compensation package and frequent and long deployments. 
Because of the retention problem, the services were forced to offer Aviation 
Continuation Pay (ACP) in an effort to equalize the pay differential between military and 
civilian pilots.  ACP helps to slow down the losses, but with the continuous high 
OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO, retention remains a concern. 
Every year the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs testifies 
before Congress concerning military personnel issues, specifically recruiting and 
retention.  Historically, aviator retention is stable, with only fixed-wing pilots being of 
major concern.  Testifying prior to  the attacks on the World Trade Center, on 24 April 
2001, Major General Terrence Murray, USMC, Assistant Deputy Commandant for 
Manpower and Reserve Affairs testified that: “Pilot retention remains a concern. The 
FY01 ACP Plan has had mixed results…Rotary Wing Pilot and Naval flight officer ‘take 
rates’ for ACP have met aggregate retention targets for these communities. Fixed wing 
pilot ‘take rates’, while improved over previous years, have not met retention targets that 
increased to compensate for the number of previous losses due to civilian airline 
hiring.”(Murray, Terrence P., MajGen, USMC and Parks, Gary L., MajGen, USMC 
2001, 1)  And in March of 2004, with the Marine Corps heavily deployed in support of 
the Global War on Terror, Lieutenant General Garry Park, USMC, reported to Congress 
that while the Marine Corps is successfully retained Rotary Wing Pilots and NFOs, there 
is still a lack of Fixed Wing Pilots.(Parks, Garry L., LtGen, USMC and Huly, Jan C., 
LtGen, USMC 2004, 1) 
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It should be noted that the Marine Corps defines retention of aviators based upon 
“take rates” of ACP.  This means that aviators are considered to be retained if they accept 
ACP and the obligated service extension.  The typical definition of retention is survival to 
either one or two years past the Expiration of Active Obligated Service (EAOS).  The 
Marine Corps is not interested in retaining aviators for one or two years past EAOS; it 
wants to retain aviators into the ranks of Major and Lieutenant Colonel.   
With the war continuing and the change in deployment cycles, retention is going 
to continue to be an issue.  In speaking before Congress in April of 2005, Lieutenant 
General H.P. Osman, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs,  
reported that the deployment cycle for Marines has changed significantly since the Global 
War on Terror.  Prior to GWOT, the deployment cycle was six months deployed followed 
by eighteen months home.  Since GWOT, the deployment cycle has increased to seven 
months deployed followed by seven months home.(Osman, H.P., LtGen, USMC 2005) 
The Marine Corps deployed 25,000 Marines to Iraq in 2004 while conducting 
operations in Haiti, Afghanistan, South Asia (tsunami relief), and the Horn of 
Africa.(Osman, H.P., LtGen, USMC 2005)  Since 2000, Marines have deployed to 
Kosovo, Afghanistan, Cuba, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, the Republic of Georgia, 
Iraq, EUCOM, Nigeria, Honduras, and South Asia.(Anonymous2005, 294)  With such 
high OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO, retention is of major concern to the Marine Corps.   
C. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This study will provide the necessary information required to determine whether a 
retention issue currently exists amongst mid-career Marine Corps aviators.  If a retention 
issue does exist, the Marine Corps will have the information necessary to warrant a look 
at the Aviation Continuation Pay program and other retention tools. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is whether the increased operational tempo and 
personnel tempo caused by Global War on Terror has affected the retention of Marine 
Corps aviators.  Secondary research questions are: 
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• Is there a difference in the GWOT retention effect based upon the type of 
aviator? 
• What steps do the Marine Corps need to take in order to meet future 

























II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. TURNOVER  
The Department of Defense is implementing better business practices in order to 
improve efficiency and reduce costs.  One of the practices that must be considered 
concerns retention.  Retention is a concern for businesses around the world and has 
become a focus for improvement in the business sector.  Firms do not want to see 
turnover increase because of the costs of recruitment, lost productivity, new-hire training, 
and lost knowledge.(McDonald 2005, C2)  Because of these costs, the overall cost for 
turnover can be as much as one half to two times the annual salary of the position 
needing to be filled.(McDonald 2005, C2) 
Private firms must be concerned with turnover and retention.  According to 
Thomas Leppert, CEO of Turner Corporation, “The No.1 issue for us is people – finding 
good, strong people with the right education and training and being able to retain 
them.”(Stribling 2005, 74)  If private business  is concerned with retention of personnel, 
then the Department of Defense must also be concerned.  
The Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM) cites the following as 
reasons for employee turnover: better compensation elsewhere, career opportunities 
elsewhere, dissatisfaction with current organization, burnout, and feeling 
unappreciated.(Anonymous2005, 3)  These issues should not just be concerns of private 
business, but they must also be concerns of the government, particularly the Department 
of Defense.  Military service members are concerned with many of the same issues 
private business employees are concerned with; compensation being one of the key 
issues.  Many service members choose to remain because of a “higher calling.”  
However, this call to duty is increasingly overshadowed by the other concerns cited.  Due 
to the on-going Global War on Terror, service members are being deployed at rates 
higher than those seen since the Vietnam War.  Because of this increased OPTEMPO, 
many service members are feeling burnt out and underappreciated, not only by the 
government, but also unappreciated by the American public.   
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The Department of Defense must be concerned about retention and turnover of 
personnel.  The aviation community is one small piece of the DoD personnel picture, but 
it is one historically affected by retention.  The costs of recruiting, training, lost 
productivity, and lost knowledge are all reasons why the DoD must be concerned with 
aviator retention.  The costs for training aviators is high; not just initial flight training, but 
also tactical training.  Also, when an aviator departs, he takes with him professional 
knowledge that cannot be replaced by a new hire.  The lost knowledge was learned over 
the course of his career, and will take six or more years to replace.  The productivity lost 
has a similar affect as the lost knowledge.  When an aviator separates, there is not another 
fully trained aviator waiting to take his place.  Instead, the experienced aviator is replaced 
with a new one fresh out of flight school.  This new aviator must undergo extensive 
training in order to fully replace the productivity of the one that separated. 
Because of the need for the transfer and maintenance of knowledge, the military 
must be concerned with turnover.  The aviation community is one of the occupational 
fields that routinely suffers from high turnover.  This is due to the highly valued general 
skills that aviators receive.  These general skills are valuable, not only to the military, but 
also to the commercial aviation community.  Because of this, turnover of aviators is a 
high interest item to all of the services.   
Elliot, Kapur, and Gresenz (2004) conducted a study titled “Modeling the 
Departure of Military Pilots from the Services.”(Elliott, Kapur, and Gresenz 2004, iii)  
This study evaluated data taken from the 1996-97 Exit Survey of Marine F/A-18 pilots.  
The four reasons cited for separation of Marine F/A-18 pilots were: 1) discrepancies in 
bonus compensation (compared to other services); 2) operational tempo; 3) distrust of the 
leadership at the Department of Defense-level; and 4) commercial airline hiring.(Elliott, 
Kapur, and Gresenz 2004, iii)  These concerns mirror the concerns of private business 
mentioned earlier.  They also are indicative of the concerns of the military aviation 
community in general.   
The high operational and personnel tempo is of great concern to all Marine Corps 
aviators.  Marine pilots deploy more frequently than Air Force pilots, who only deploy 
for 90-day periods(Tirpak 1997, ).  Marine pilots also deploy at a rate equal to or greater 
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than that of Navy pilots.  In addition, the conditions of Marine Corps deployments are 
typically much harsher than those of their Navy and Air Force counterparts.  These 
factors are likely to lead to higher frustration and dissatisfaction with Marine Corps 
OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO.   
Finally, the commercial airline industry can take advantage of both pay and 
OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO concerns of military pilots.  The commercial airline industry 
offers better compensation and a much lower personnel tempo.  In 1997, the annual 
salary for a Captain in the major commercial airline industry exceeded $175,000; more 
than double that of a Marine Corps Major (O-4).(Elliott, Kapur, and Gresenz 2004, iii)  
Also, according to a RAND study, commercial airline pilots have shorter workweeks than 
military pilots and greater control and flexibility of work schedules.(Elliott, Kapur, and 
Gresenz 2004, iii)  These issues make the commercial airline industry a much more 
attractive opportunity to military pilots, particularly Marine pilots.  With the increased 
OPTEMPO due to the GWOT and the uncertainty about the length of the GWOT, many 
pilots see the commercial airline industry as an opportunity to improve their lifestyles and 
family situations. 
B. RELATIVE PAY AND AVIATOR RETENTION 
It is important to understand the relationship between pay and retention in both 
the civilian and military sectors.  In the civilian marketplace, firms must compete with 
each other in order to attract the best employees.  The military is forced to compete with 
the civilian labor market for employees.  The military is hindered in its capability to 
compete because of Congressionally mandated pay scales.  On a strictly financial basis, 
the civilian market is much more attractive than the military market, especially for the 
aviation community. 
The civilian aviation community offers much greater monetary compensation than 
the military aviation community.  The military recognizes the importance of these pay 
differences and has attempted to narrow the difference in compensation.  While the 




primary incentive is Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) which is a monthly pay given 
to all military aviators based upon years of aviation experience.  As experience increases, 
ACIP also increases.   
The second incentive offered to aviators is Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP).  
ACP is offered only upon completion of the initial service obligation and is intended to 
entice Majors (O-4) to stay through sixteen years of service.  The Marine Corps believes 
that by retaining an aviator through sixteen years of service, it will increase the likelihood 
of retention through twenty years.  The Marine Corps would like to get as much service 
as possible out of its aviators, primarily due to the high cost associated with replacing 
them.  The effects of both ACIP and ACP as well as the effect of pay, in general, have 
been the subject of numerous studies. 
A study conducted by Kostiuk (1985) evaluated the effect of pay on the retention 
of Marine Corps aviators.(Kostiuk 1985, i)  The study was intended to evaluate a career 
bonus for aviators (ACP).  Kostiuk (1985) viewed pay as a key factor affecting retention 
because “aviators will choose the career that maximizes the value of discounted lifetime 
earnings.”(Kostiuk 1985, i)  Kostiuk (1985) used basic economic theory to assert that 
aviators will choose the career (military or civilian) which offers the best pay.  The study 
compared the military and civilian earnings of Captains and Majors with 6-14 years of 
services between the years 1973 and 1982.(Kostiuk 1985, i) 
Kostiuk’s (1985) logistic regression model used attrition as the dependent variable 
and an ACOL Pay variable, the change in the number of pilots employed by civilian 
airlines, and dummy variables for years of service 7 through 14, as the independent 
variables.  This simple model revealed that the Marine Corps could save training funds 
by paying bonuses in order to increase aviator retention.(Kostiuk 1985, i)  The cost, in 
1985 dollars, to train one Marine Corps pilot was $850,000.(Kostiuk 1985, i)  The study 
showed that it would be less expensive to retain one aviator rather than to train one.   
Cymrot and Byrnes (1988) conducted a study of Navy Pilot continuation rates that 
placed heavy emphasis on the financial aspect of the decision.  The study came about as 
the result of the 1987 increase in the naval aviator service requirement.(Cymrot and 
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Byrnes 1988, i)  The dependent variable for the logistic regression model was 
continuation and the independent variables were net pay, civilian airline hires, 
unemployment rate, an interaction between net pay and being a jet pilot, and an 
interaction between net pay and being a prop pilot.(Cymrot and Byrnes 1988, i)  The 
results revealed that as the gap between military and civilian pay is narrowed, the 
continuation rate will increase.(Cymrot and Byrnes 1988, i)  Therefore, increasing ACP 
will increase the continuation rate.  The study also showed that a robust civilian airline 
industry or civilian economy, in general, have negative effects on Navy pilot 
continuation.(Cymrot and Byrnes 1988, i) 
Cymrot (1989) conducted another study on the military aviation community, 
focusing on the implementation of the ACP program.  Cymrot (1989) selected two 
samples: Navy pilots and Navy NFOs.(Cymrot 1989, 3)  The study modeled continuation 
based on a military-to-civilian pay ratio interacted with helicopter, jet, and prop pilots, 
the unemployment rate for 20 year old males interacted with the three pilot communities, 
and civilian aviation hiring rates interacted with the three pilot communities.(Cymrot 
1989, 3)  The same model was used for the Navy NFO sample. 
The results of the study showed that all aviators (pilots and NFOs) are responsive 
to monetary incentives.  The results of both models showed that, as the gap between 
military and civilian pay gets smaller, continuation rates increase.  Jet pilots also 
appeared to be more responsive to such pay changes, while prop and helicopter pilots 
were similar and more responsive than NFOs.(Cymrot 1989, 3)  All aviators exhibited 
negative reactions to both the unemployment rate and the rate of civilian hiring.  Prop 
pilots were very responsive to increases in civilian hiring, while helicopter pilots were the 
most responsive to changes in the unemployment rate.(Cymrot 1989, 3)   The results of 
this study showed that continuation is affected by relative pay, and that continuation rates 
can be controlled with pay measures such as ACP.   
C. OPERATIONAL / PERSONNEL TEMPO AND RETENTION 
The subject of OPTEMPO and its relationship to retention has been evaluated in 
numerous prior studies.  The recurring findings from these studies show that as the 
number of deployments increases, the likelihood of an individual choosing to stay in the 
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military also increases.  The definition of retention varies across these studies, and there 
are different approaches to identify deployments.  The methodology also differs between 
studies; some evaluate the effect of deployments, some differentiate between hostile and 
non-hostile deployments and others evaluate the length of time between deployments. 
Cooke, Marcus, and Quester (1992) conducted a study of the effect of OPTEMPO 
and PERSTEMPO on enlisted retention that evaluated the retention decisions of Navy 
sailors between Fiscal Years 1979 and 1998. (Cooke, Marcus, and Quester 1992, i)  The 
study defined retention as actively reenlisting or extending two years beyond EAOS.  The 
authors omitted those individuals extending for periods less than two years.(Cooke, 
Marcus, and Quester 1992, i)  Therefore, the individuals who were labeled as having 
“separated” were those who chose not to continue at EAOS.  This definition of retention 
fails to take into account the separation decision of those who extended less than two 
years and later decided to separate after the initial extension. 
Cooke, Marcus, and Quester (1992) specified a reenlistment model, by use of a 
logistic regression, in which the independent variables included race, marital status, 
ASVAB score, Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB), military-to-civilian pay ratio, 
unemployment rate, Navy Enlisted Classification, percentage of time underway, time 
between deployments, length of last deployment, and whether or not the sailor was 
deployed at the time of making the reenlistment decision.(Cooke, Marcus, and Quester 
1992, i)  The study evaluates the reenlistment decision of three groups: 1) 4-year obligors 
at their first reenlistment decision; 2) married 4-year obligors at their first reenlistment 
decision; and 3) sailors with 8-10 YOS.(Cooke, Marcus, and Quester 1992, i) 
The study found similarities across all three sample groups.  For all three groups, 
deployments increase the likelihood of reenlistment.  The length of deployments were 
also found to play a role in the reenlistment decision.  Very long deployments (greater 
than eight months) result in a decrease in the likelihood to reenlist as compared to sailors 
with either short or long deployments.  Therefore, deployments greater than eight months 
have a negative effect on reenlistment, whereas deployments less than eight months have 
a positive effect.  The study also found that, for all three groups, time between 
deployments has a negative effect on reenlistment.  Those sailors experiencing shorter 
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time spans between deployments were more likely to reenlist than those sailors with 
longer time between deployments.  Finally, the study found that those sailors who are 
deployed at EAOS are less likely to reenlist than those who were not deployed at 
EAOS.(Cooke, Marcus, and Quester 1992, i) 
The results of this study were explained by appealing to the theories of self-
selection and job matching. (Cooke, Marcus, and Quester 1992, i)  Self-selection is 
defined as individual sailors self-selecting into their second tour (i.e. reenlisting) 
according to their individual tastes.  If an individual prefers sea duty and deploying, then 
he is more likely to reenlist.(Cooke, Marcus, and Quester 1992, i)  The theory of job 
matching states that the better the job-person fit, the more likely the sailor will 
reenlist.(Cooke, Marcus, and Quester 1992, i)  Both self-selection and job matching 
explain why those sailors who deploy less than eight months and those who have shorter 
time periods between deployments are more likely to reenlist.  These individuals self-
select their sea tours because they have a taste for life at sea and life deployed.   
Beyond eight months, the effects of self-selection and job matching cannot 
compensate for the deprivations suffered during very long periods at sea.  The standard 
deployment is six months in length.  Most sailors accept this length, and anything beyond 
six months is considered non-standard.  Those sailors who self-select because they enjoy 
sea life have learned to enjoy periods up to six months at sea.  When faced with a 
deployment that exceeds the standard deployment length, these same sailors cannot be 
expected to maintain a high level of satisfaction with Navy life.  Hence, very long 
deployments have a negative effect on reenlistment.  Likewise, if a sailor wants to deploy 
but has to endure a long period between deployments, theoretically this sailor may decide 
that he is not longer satisfied with the Navy life and elect to separate.(Cooke, Marcus, 
and Quester 1992, i) 
Hosek and Totten (2002) conducted a study of first-term enlistees in all services, 
at the request of the Department of Defense, in order to determine the effect of time away 
from home (deployed time) on the reenlistment decisions of military personnel.(Hosek 
and Totten 2002, i)  The authors developed two probit regression models to evaluate the 
effects of deployments.  The first model evaluated hostile and non-hostile deployments 
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independent of each other; while the second model evaluated the interaction between 
hostile and non-hostile deployments.(Hosek and Totten 2002, i)   
Hosek and Totten (2002) used Defense Manpower Data Center PERSTEMPO 
data in order to determine a deployment episode.  Family Separation Allowance was used 
to identify an individual as being deployed, and Imminent Danger Pay was used to 
identify a hostile deployment.(Hosek and Totten 2002, i)  The study was limited to an 
evaluation of the three-year period preceding the reenlistment decision.  The authors 
chose to ignore any deployments before this period because the majority of enlistees were 
four-year obligors who spend the first year in a training status from Recruit Training to 
A-School.(Hosek and Totten 2002, i)  These individuals were followed to one year after 
EAOS in order to determine retention.  For those individuals who extended, the study 
followed them for two years after EAOS.  If the extenders remained in service for two 
years, they were considered to have been retained.(Hosek and Totten 2002, i) 
The results of the first (non-interacted) probit model revealed that, for enlisted 
Marines, the first-term reenlistment probability increases with the number of non-hostile 
deployments and remains stable with increasing episodes of hostile deployments.(Hosek 
and Totten 2002, i)  The interacted model showed that the likelihood of reenlisting 
increases as the number of deployments increase, whether hostile or non-hostile.(Hosek 
and Totten 2002, i)   
Hosek and Totten (2002) explain this phenomenon with the theory of “self-
selection.”  They hypothesize that members enter the military with naïve expectations 
about how much they will like deployment, the frequency and duration of deployment, 
and the variance of frequency and duration.(Hosek and Totten 2002, i)  These 
expectations are updated through a learning process.(Hosek and Totten 2002, i)  As the 
individual experiences a deployment, his views and expectations are modified.  The more 
deployments an individual experiences, the more accurate the expectations become.  This 
means that an individual is constantly refining his expectations and tastes with each 
deployment.  Therefore, individuals with more deployments have a stronger taste for 
deployments and are more likely to remain in the military.   
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Fricker (2002) evaluated the effect of PERSTEMPO on officer retention for all 
services.  Fricker defined retention as being on active duty one year following the 
completion of the initial service obligation.(Fricker 2002, iii)  This definition is rather 
narrow because some officers remain in service more than a year beyond EAOS in order 
to better weigh their options; some of these individuals depart two or three years after 
EAOS.   
Fricker (2002) evaluated how hostile and non-hostile deployments affect officer 
retention.(Fricker 2002, iii)  He used Imminent Danger Pay and Family Separation 
Allowance from the DMDC PERSTEMPO file in order to determine deployment 
status.(Fricker 2002, iii)  Imminent Danger Pay is an indicator of the individual being on 
a hostile deployment, whereas Family Separation Allowance indicates whether an 
individual is in a “deployed” status.  Using Family Separation Allowance (FSA) alone is 
a questionable method to determine non-hostile deployments.  This is because FSA only 
indicates that an individual has been away from home for greater than 30 days.  Most 
officers do not consider themselves to be in a “deployed” status just because they are 
away from home for 31 days.  This is because the general belief of Marines is that 
deployments last a minimum of 90-days.  The 90-day minimum length coincides with the 
requirement for awarding of the Sea Service Deployment Ribbon.  Marines use the Sea 
Service Deployment Ribbon as the generally accepted indicator that an individual has 
deployed.  Unfortunately, the use of periods of less than 90 days as an indicator of 
deployment has been generally accepted for research purposes. 
Separation is the dependent variable in Fricker’s multivariate logistic regression 
model.  The independent variables include one deployment, two deployments, three 
deployments, one hostile deployment, two hostile deployments, three hostile 
deployments, occupational field, gender, having dependents, being an Academy graduate, 
race, and dummy variables for the year of EAOS.(Fricker 2002, iii)  This study did not 
investigate the effect of pay and unemployment rate on the decision to separate. 
The Fricker (2002) study found that increasing the number of non-hostile 
deployments increases the likelihood of retention, while increasing the number of hostile 
deployments has no noticeable effect on retention.(Fricker 2002, iii)  Fricker also 
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grouped the officers into separate occupational codes, one of which was “Pilot.”(Fricker 
2002, iii)  The study revealed that a pilot with one non-hostile deployment is 46% less 
likely to separate than a pilot with no deployments.(Fricker 2002, iii)  Results also 
revealed that pilots with one hostile deployment are 29.6% less likely to separate than 
pilots with no hostile deployments.(Fricker 2002, iii)   
Overall, Fricker’s (2002) results show that deployments in general increase 
retention among all officers, particularly pilots. The explanation given for this is the 
theory of “self-selection.”(Fricker 2002, iii)  This theory of “self-selection” indicates that 
officers who deploy the most frequently are volunteers.  Those that do not deploy, or 
deploy less than other officers, do not wish to deploy.  In addition, those officers who 
“self-select” to deploy also “self-select” to stay; these are the officers who are the most 
compatible with military service, while those who do not deploy are less compatible with 
military service, and as such and so more likely to separate. 
Pierre (2005) conducted a more recent evaluation of the effect of deployment on 
enlisted retention.  The subject of her study was the Navy’s Hospital Corpsman specialty.  
The purpose of her study was to evaluate the effect of deployments on the Hospital 
Corpsman community since the beginning of the Global War on Terror.(Pierre 2005, i)  
The data consisted of two files of Hospital Corpsmen between the ranks of E-3 and E-6.  
The first data file contained data on all Hospital Corpsmen on active duty in 1998 who 
were eligible to reenlist prior to 11 September 2001.  The second file contained data on 
all Hospital Corpsmen on active duty on 11 September 2001 who were eligible to reenlist 
prior to 31 March 2004.(Pierre 2005, i)  Those sailors extending their enlistment but not 
reenlisting were ignored, and the study only looked at those who decided to reenlist or 
separate during each particular period. 
The Pierre (2005) study attempted to identify a Global War on Terror effect for 
Hospital Corpsmen who were exposed to frequent deployments because of the war.  The 
study modeled retention as predicted by gender, race, education, number of dependents, 
marital status, age at EAOS, duty type, deployment status, pay grade, and occupational 
field.(Pierre 2005, i)  The results of the study revealed that being deployed increases the 
probability of reenlisting for both periods. (Pierre 2005, i)    
 23
The Pierre (2005) thesis used sailors on shore duty with no deployments as the 
control group from which to make comparisons for both samples.  Both samples revealed 
that the probability of reenlisting is greater for those sailors who have deployed.  Also, it 
appears that increasing the number of deployments has a positive effect on sailors’ 
decisions to reenlist.(Pierre 2005, i)   
The results of the Pierre thesis are consistent with previous studies addressing the 
relationship between OPTEMPO and retention.  The Pierre thesis shows that increased 
OPTEMPO does have a positive effect on retention.  The thesis also showed that Hospital 
Corpsmen exhibited similar relationships with respect to deployments in both time 
periods, 1998 and 2001.  This showed that the observed effects of the GWOT on 
retention were not negative for Navy Hospital Corpsmen. 
The available literature reveals some important relationships that are not 
intuitively understood.  The average service member would argue that the likelihood of 
being retained in the service decreases for service members who are deployed more 
frequently.  The literature, however, reveals that service members who deploy multiple 
times are more likely to stay in the military.  The explanations given are those of “self-
selection” and “job matching.”  These are good explanations during normal times.  
However, with the ongoing War on Terror, self-selection may no longer apply to the 
Marine Corps.  Every Marine can expect to deploy multiple times prior to the end of his 
or her commitment.  There is no longer an opportunity to “self-select” for deployments; 
deploying is even more of a way of life for Marines now. 
Hosek, Kavanaugh, and Miller (2006) conducted the most recent analysis on the 
topic by evaluating the effect that deployments had on service members’ retention 
decisions during the GWOT period.  The authors acknowledged the previously 
mentioned Hosek and Totten (2002) RAND study does not accurately portray the 
relationship between deployments and retention in the Global War on Terror era.(Hosek, 
Kavanaugh, and Miller 2006, ) This most recent study integrates the DMDC Status of 
Forces Surveys of Active Duty Personnel for March and July 2003 with focus groups 
conducted in the first six months of 2004.  The focus groups included both enlisted and 
officers from each of the services and focused on “expectations of service life, 
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expectations of deployment, most valuable military experiences, unexpected challenges, 
deployment experiences, suggestions for improved preparation for service life and 
deployments, and reenlistment or career plans.”(Hosek, Kavanaugh, and Miller 2006, ) 
The DMDC surveys focused on stress and a service member’s intent to stay in the 
military.(Hosek, Kavanaugh, and Miller 2006, )  The primary results from this analysis 
include the sociological factors related deployment and their effects on retention 
behavior. 
The authors conducted focus groups with both officer and enlisted personnel on 
bases with units that had returned from duty in either Afghanistan or Iraq.(Hosek, 
Kavanaugh, and Miller 2006, )  The purpose of the focus groups was to identify 
sociological factors related to deployment, which could then be analyzed using logistic 
regression.  The sociological factors identified were: 
a.  Pre-deployment stress which involves the amount of pre-deployment 
exercises required, and longer work hours as well as personal stress related 
to preparing family members for the separation.(Hosek, Kavanaugh, and 
Miller 2006, 37) 
b.  Longer and more frequent deployments.(Hosek, Kavanaugh, and Miller 
2006, 38) 
c.  Increased work pace and longer work hours while deployed. (Hosek, 
Kavanaugh, and Miller 2006, 39) 
d.  Uncertainty before and during the deployment.(Hosek, Kavanaugh, and 
Miller 2006, 41) 
e.  Physical and environmental stressors involving conditions that service 
members must live in, as well as the physical danger expected as a result 
of being deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq.(Hosek, Kavanaugh, and Miller 
2006, 40) 
f.  Family separation, and reintegration with family and community, which 
involves both the family members’ concern for the deployed service 
member as well as the service member’s concern for his or her 
family.(Hosek, Kavanaugh, and Miller 2006, 42)  
Hosek, Kavanaugh, and Miller (2006) identify key sociological factors that 
contribute to the decision to stay or leave.  These factors explain why deployment affects 
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retention rather than how deployments affect retention.  This study lays the groundwork 
for future studies attempting to explain the effects of deployment on retention behavior in 


































































III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
A. DATA SOURCES AND LIMITATIONS 
1. Data Sources 
The data for this thesis come from three sources.  The historical civilian airline 
industry hiring rate comes from Air, Inc.(Anonymous2006, )  Data on individual Marines 
come from the Marine Corps’ Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) and the Department 
of Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) PERSTEMPO file.  The Marine Corps’ 
Total Force Data Warehouse is the source for all demographic data on each individual 
Marine aviator.  This data was merged with deployment data obtained from the DMDC 
PERSTEMPO file.   
Due to limited historical data available from DMDC, this thesis evaluates a ten- 
year period from FY1995 through FY2005.  This is further broken into two periods: pre-
9/11 and post-9/11.  The Pre-9/11 period contains FY1995 to FY2001, and the Post-9/11 
(GWOT) period includes FY2002 to FY2005.  The data are broken into these two periods 
based upon the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 
2001.  The timing of these attacks coincides with the end of FY2001, which is the end of 
the first data period (Pre-9/11).  Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. entered into 
a prolonged period of war that has been identified as the Global War on Terror.  This 
thesis evaluates the retention decisions of Marine aviators who were eligible to separate 
in each of the periods identified by the study. 
The data set consists of demographic information based on a snapshot at the time 
of each Marine aviator’s Expiration of Active Obligated Service (EAOS).  Therefore, 
demographic information is taken from the time that the Marine made his or her retention 
decision.  The information was collected based on the characteristics at this time because 
these are the demographic factors most likely to influence the retention decision.  The 
demographic data obtained through TFDW include age, race, gender, marital status, 
number of children, commissioning source, prior enlisted service, type of aviator, 
Weapons and Tactics Instructor MOS, and Forward Air Controller MOS.  The data 
obtained from DMDC are deployment related and include the total number of 
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deployments, the number of non-hostile deployments, and the number of hostile 
deployments prior to making the retention decision. 
2. Data Limitations 
The data from the Marine Corps’ TFDW are updated monthly and are considered 
by the Marine Corps to be highly accurate.  TFDW contains the majority of the data 
needed for the thesis.  In order to simplify, a snapshot was taken on 30 September for 
each fiscal year.  This snapshot gives an indication of each individual Marine’s 
demographic status at the end of the fiscal year. 
The DMDC PERSTEMPO file uses Family Separation Allowance (FSA) and 
Imminent Danger Pay (IDP) to calculate a proxy for deployment status.  FSA is only 
received after an individual is separated from his family for 30-days.  IDP is received 
when an individual is in a combat zone.  While IDP is a good indicator of a hostile 
deployment, FSA can be received on occasions that the Marine Corps does not consider 
to be deployments. 
The standard deployment for Marines is the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special 
Operations Capable (MEU (SOC)) deployment.  This deployment consists of a six-month 
work-up period immediately followed by a six-month deployment.  During the work-up 
period, a Marine may be away from home for as many as three months.  This work-up 
period is not considered to be part of the deployment; the deployment does not begin 
until the ship pulls out of port and steams across the ocean. 
While the majority of Marines deploy as part of the MEU (SOC), there are other 
ways to deploy such as the Unit Deployment Program (UDP) to Japan and deployments 
in support of contingency operations.  Most Marines consider a deployment to be one that 
is outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) and for a minimum duration of 90-
days.  The 90-day duration is considered the minimum because this is the number of days 
required in order to receive the Sea Service Deployment Ribbon.  This ribbon serves as 
an indicator of deployed service for the Marine Corps. 
Based on the standard MEU (SOC) deployment as well as the duration 
requirement for the Sea Service Deployment Ribbon, the PERSTEMPO data received 
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from DMDC had to be modified in order to be useful in studying Marine Corps 
deployments.  All deployments of duration less than 90-days (3 months) were censored, 
unless the individual received IDP.  If an individual received IDP, then this is an 
indication that he was OCONUS and deployed to a combat zone.  In order to account for 
possible accounting errors, this study considers two consecutive months in receipt of IDP 
as one episode of deployment. 
B. DEPENDENT AND EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
1. Description of the Marine Corps Aviator Demographics 
Table 3.1 provides a description of Marine Corps aviators in the data set as 
Pooled data, Pre-9/11 data, and Post-9/11 (GWOT) data.  The frequency distributions and 
descriptive statistics give insight into changes in the characteristics of Marine Corps 
aviators over the time period from FY1995 to FY2005.   
An analysis of the Pre-9/11 and GWOT groups indicates significant differences in 
Marine Corps aviators’ demographics between the two periods; these differences are 
annotated in Table 3.1.  The most significant difference between the two groups is the 
retention rate.  Retention for the GWOT period was 65.96% while the Pre-9/11 period 
saw a retention rate of 97.19%.  The Chi-Square statistic for the association of retention 
and time period is statistically significant at the .01 level. 
The GWOT period group consists of significantly more minorities (5.61%) and 
females (2.51%) than the Pre-9/11 period (3.14% minorities and no females).  The 
GWOT period aviators are older and more likely to be Service Academy graduates than 
ROTC graduates compared to the Pre-9/11 period.  Finally, the GWOT period consists of 
significantly more Fixed-Wing Pilots (40.05%) and fewer Rotary-Wing Pilots (49.63%) 
than the Pre-9/11 period, 34.36% and 54.8%, respectively.   
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RETAINED*** 83.27% 97.19% 65.96% 
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Race*** 
        White 92.29% 93.53% 90.74% 
        Minority 4.24% 3.14% 5.61% 
Gender*** 
         Male 98.89% 100% 97.48% 
         Female 1.12% 0.0% 2.51% 
Dependents 
         Single no children 18.83% 18.93% 18.75% 
         Single with children 15.93% 1.22% 1.89% 
         Married with children 53.69% 53.70% 53.69% 
         Married no children 18.83% 18.93% 18.75% 
Age (mean, in years)+++ 32.49 31.90 32.23 
MILITARY SERVICE CHARACTERISTICS 
Source of Commission*** 
         Academy 13.65% 10.52% 17.55% 
         ROTC 13.03% 14.76% 10.89% 
         OCS 70.92% 70.74% 71.16% 
Type of Aviator*** 
         Fixed Wing Pilot 36.89% 34.36% 40.05% 
         Rotary Wing Pilot 52.50% 54.80% 49.63% 
         Naval Flight Officer 10.60% 10.84% 10.32% 
Prior Enlisted 4.30% 4.44% 4.14% 
Weapons and Tactics 
Instructor*** 
17.16% 18.55% 15.43% 
Forward Air Controller 9.56% 9.01% 10.24% 
Present Value of ACP (mean, 
in $) +++ 
$40,976 $30,669 $53,796 
CIVILIAN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
Airline Hires (mean, in number 
of pilots) +++ 
3,880 4,490 3,120 
SOURCE: Author  *** ChiSq statistic significant at the .01 level +++ T-statistic significant at the .01 level 
    ** ChiSq statistic significant at the .05 level   ++ T-statistic significant at the .05 level 
        * ChiSq statistic significant at the .10 level     + T-statistic significant at the .10 level 
 
2. Description of Marine Corps Aviator Deployment Distribution 
Analyzing the distribution of deployments in the Pooled, Pre-9/11, and GWOT 
samples provides significant explanatory information.  As shown in Table 3.2, nearly 
twice as many aviators from the GWOT group have more than two deployments as 
compared to aviators from the Pre-9/11 group.  Nearly 31% of the aviators in the GWOT 
group have more than two deployments, while only 18.6% of the Pre-9/11 group have 
more than two deployments.  Table 3.2 also shows that fewer aviators from the GWOT 
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group have less than two deployments than those in the Pre-9/11 group (69.4% and 
81.4%, respectively).  A Chi-Square test indicates that the differences in the number of 
deployments between the two groups are statistically significant.  This is most likely 
attributable to the increased OPTEMPO created by the GWOT.  It is more likely that 
aviators in the GWOT group will deploy three or more times during the first Fleet Marine 
Force (FMF) tour.  This is a result of the current deployment cycle that exists in the FMF 
with seven months deployed followed by seven months home.   
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 provide cross-tabulations of deployments separately for the 
Pre-9/11 and GWOT groups.  This comparison shows that there are more Pre-9/11 
Marine aviators with no deployments (15.1%) or only one deployment (28.7%) than 
GWOT aviators with similar numbers of deployments (10.6% and 23.3%, respectively).  
These tables also reinforce the conclusions from Table 3.2; nearly twice as many aviators 
from the GWOT group have more than two deployments than those in the Pre-9/11 group 
(30.5% and 17.5%, respectively).  These distributions strongly support the expectation 
that the increased OPTEMPO from the GWOT has in fact increased the number of 
deployments for Marine aviators.  This is shown in the smaller number of aviators who 
have not deployed, as well as the greater number of aviators who have more than two 
deployments in the GWOT group.  This group has endured a deployment cycle of seven 
months deployed and seven months home.  This has increased the OPTEMPO, which in 
turn has increased the opportunities for deployments prior to being eligible to separate. 
 
Table 3.2. Distribution of Total Deployments (1995-2005) 




Pooled Sample        
(1995-2005) 
0 204 (15.1%) 116 (10.6%) 320 (13.1%) 
1 387 (28.6%) 255 (23.4%) 642 (26.3%) 
2 509 (37.7%) 387 (35.4%) 896 (36.7%) 
>2 251 (18.6%) 334 (30.6%) 585 (23.9%) 
Total 1,351 (100%) 1,092 (100%) 2,443 (100%) 
SOURCE:  Author       
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Table 3.3. Distribution of Hostile and Non-Hostile Deployments (Pre-9/11 
Group, 1995-2001) 
 Hostile 
Non-Hostile 0 1 2 >2 Total 
0 204 (15.1%) 229 (17.0%) 192 (14.2%) 60 (4.4%) 685 (50.7%) 
1 158 (11.7%) 186 (13.8%) 63 (4.7%) 24 (1.8%) 431 (31.9%) 
2 131 (9.7%) 53 (3.9%) 15 (1.1%) 2 (0.1%) 201 (14.9%) 
>2 27 (2.0%) 5 (0.4%) 2 (0.1%) 0 (0.0%) 34 (2.5%) 
Total 520 (38.5%) 473 (35.0%) 272 (20.1%) 86 (6.4%) 1,351 (100%) 
SOURCE:  Author  
 
Table 3.4. Distribution of Hostile and Non-Hostile Deployments (GWOT Group, 
2002-2005) 
 Hostile 
Non-Hostile 0 1 2 >2 Total 
0 116 (10.6%) 184 (16.8%) 220 (20.1%) 115 (10.5%) 635 (58.2%) 
1 71 (6.5%) 117 (10.7%) 91 (8.3%) 44 (4.0%) 323 (29.6%) 
2 50 (4.6%) 37 (3.4%) 15 (1.4%) 11 (1.0%) 113 (10.3%) 
>2 12 (1.1%) 5 (0.5%) 3 (0.3%) 1 (0.0%) 21 (1.9%) 
Total 249 (22.8%) 343 (31.4%) 329 (30.1%) 171 (15.7%) 1092 (100%) 




1. Theoretical Model 
Multiple regression analysis is a valuable tool in explaining retention decisions. 
The logistic regression model is appropriate for the analysis of retention because the 
dependent variable “retain” is binary with a value equal to one for those staying and a 
value equal to zero for those who separate.  The theoretical model is: 
Li = ln [Pi/(1-Pi)] = α + βxi 
where: 
Li = log of the odds ratio 
Pi = probability that an individual stays, given the personal attributes  
        in Xi (vector of explanatory variables) 
α = intercept parameter 
β = vector of slope parameters 
2. Multivariate Logistic Regression Models 
Three multivariate logistic regression models are utilized in this study.  Each of 
these regression models is run for three separate samples: a Pooled Sample, the Pre-9/11 
Sample, and the GWOT Sample.  The first model is the Total Deployment Model that 
evaluates the effects of deployments, both hostile and non-hostile, on the retention 
decision of aviators in each of the three groups.  The deployment variables used are D0 
(zero deployments), D1 (one deployment), D2 (two deployments), and D3 (more than 
two deployments).  The second model evaluates the effects of non-hostile and hostile 
deployments independently.  The deployment variables are N0 (zero non-hostile 
deployments), N1 (one non-hostile deployment), N23 (multiple non-hostile deployments), 
H0 (zero hostile deployments), H1 (one hostile deployment) and H23 (multiple hostile 
deployments).  The third model evaluates the interaction between non-hostile and hostile 
deployments.  The deployment variables for this model are N0H0 (zero deployments), 
N0H (zero non-hostile and at least one hostile deployment), N1H0 (one non-hostile and 
zero hostile deployments), N1H1 (one non-hostile and one hostile deployments), N23H0 
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(multiple non-hostile and zero hostile deployments), and N23H (multiple non-hostile and 
at least one hostile deployments).   
a. Total Deployment Regression Model 
The Total Deployment empirical model used to find predicted 
probabilities of retention for Marine Corps aviators is: 
ln [Pi/(1-Pi)] = β0 + β1(age) + β2(minority) + β3(female) + + β4(ROTC) + 
β5(OCS) + β6(Prior Enlisted) + β7(RWP) + β8(NFO) + β9(WTI) + β10(FAC) + β11(PV 
ACP) + β12(Hires) + β13(MWC) + β14(MNC) + β15(SWC) +  β16(D1) + β17(D2) + β18(D3) 
+ β19(N) + β20(Hostile) + β21(GWOT)  
b. Non Interacted Deployment Regression Model 
The Non-Interacted Deployment model evaluates the effect of non-hostile 
and hostile deployments independently (not interacted with each other).  The Non-
Interacted Deployment empirical model used to find predicted probabilities of retention 
for Marine Corps aviators is: 
ln [Pi/(1-Pi)] = β0 + β1(age) + β2(minority) + β3(female) + β4(ROTC) + 
β5(OCS) + β6(Prior Enlisted) + β7(RWP) + β8(NFO) + β9(WTI) + β10(FAC) + β11(PV 
ACP) + β12(Hires) + β13(MWC) + β14(MNC) + β15(SWC) +  β16(N1) + β17(N23) + 
β18(H1) + β19(H23) + β20(GWOT)  
c. Interacted Deployment Regression Model 
The Interacted Deployment Model evaluates the effects of interactions 
between non-hostile and hostile deployments on the retention decision. The Interacted 
Deployment empirical model used to predict probabilities for first-term Marine Corps 
aviators is: 
ln [Pi/(1-Pi)] = β0 + β1(age) + β2(minority) + β3(female) + β4(ROTC) + 
β5(OCS) + β6(Prior Enlisted) + β7(RWP) + β8(NFO) + β9(WTI) + β10(FAC) + β11(PV 
ACP) + β12(Hires) + β13(MWC) + β14(MNC) + β15(SWC) + β16(N0H) + β17(N1H0) + 
β18(N1H) + β19(N23H0) + β20(N23H) + β21(GWOT)  
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IV. RETENTION MODEL  
A. DEFINING RETENTION  
Retention and the turnover of the officer corps of any armed force is always a 
concern.  Studies have generally focused on the retention of individuals.  Previous 
retention studies often define retention as “surviving” two years beyond the end of his or 
her initial service obligation.  This study evaluates the retention decisions of Marine 
aviators between fiscal years 1995 through 2005.  If the standard two-year survival period 
were used, this study would need to be adjusted to include only those aviators whose 
initial service commitment ended in fiscal year 2003.  This would omit those Marine 
aviators whose Expiration of Active Obligated Service (EAOS) occurred in fiscal years 
2004 and 2005.  The latter individuals are likely to be more affected by the Global War 
on Terror than any previous fiscal year cohort.  In order to include these two cohorts, this 
study will modify the survival definition for retention.  For the purpose of this study, 
retention is defined as surviving at least six months after the Expiration of Active 
Obligated Service.  This will allow an evaluation of the retention behavior of GWOT-
period aviators. 
This study will evaluate the retention decisions of aviators whose active obligated 
service expired between October 1994 and June 2005.  This window is further divided 
into two periods separated by the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 
September 11, 2001 (9/11).  The pre-9/11 sample consists of those aviators who made a 
retention decision between October 1994 and September 2001.  The post-9/11 sample 
consists of those aviators who made the retention decision between October 2001 and 
June 2005.  Separating this population into two samples is supported by a Log Likelihood 
Test.  A Log Likelihood test was conducted in order to determine if a significant 
difference exists between these two samples.  The results of the test reveal that the 
samples are significantly different and must be evaluated separately. 
 36
B. FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH RETENTION 
1. Personal Characteristics 
a. Age at EAOS 
Labor economic theory states, “the quality of job matches should rise with 
age.”(Ehrenberg and Smith 2003, 587)  Job matching is important since it is a primary 
factor in an individual’s decision to remain with his current employer or to seek other 
employment.  As the individual gains more experience, he learns more about his 
employer and what is expected of him.  A younger individual has less experience and is 
learning more about employers and about his expectations with respect to an employment 
situation.(Ehrenberg and Smith 2003, 587)  As an individual gets older, he has a better 
idea of what he expects with respect to employment.   
Because of the labor economic theory that job matching improves with 
age, it is expected that as an aviator gets older, he is gaining experience.  He is learning 
about the Marine Corps and learning about his own wants and expectations.  He is 
learning whether or not he is compatible with the Marine Corps and if he wants to remain 
in the Corps. 
A Marine aviator does not have the option of quitting his job whenever he 
wants, as the average civilian employee does.  The Marine can only resign upon 
completion of his obligation; therefore, age must be evaluated at the time of EAOS.  This 
is when the Marine can first make the decision to retain or separate.  Therefore, based 
upon labor economic theory, it is expected that the older the Marine aviator is at EAOS, 
the more likely he will remain in the service.   
b. Race 
Differences in race can be the basis for discrimination in the labor market.  
The study of labor economics reveals that market discrimination may exist based upon 
race.  Three general theories for market discrimination are discussed in Ehrenberg (2003).  
These include personal prejudice, statistical prejudgment, and the presence of 
noncompetitive forces in the labor market.(Ehrenberg and Smith 2003, 587) 
These theories of labor market discrimination explain the wage and 
employment discrimination that exists in the marketplace.  The idea of personal prejudice 
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lies in the fact that some “employers, fellow employees, or customers dislike associating 
with workers of a given race.”(Ehrenberg and Smith 2003, 587)  Statistical prejudgment 
exists when “employers project onto individuals certain perceived group 
characteristics.”(Ehrenberg and Smith 2003, 587)  And, lastly, labor economic theory 
states that noncompetitive forces are present in the labor market which result in 
discrimination based upon one’s race.(Ehrenberg and Smith 2003, 587) 
These theories hypothesize about the causes of discrimination in the 
civilian labor market.  It can be argued that this same discrimination exists in the military, 
but not to the extent that it does in the civilian labor market.  The military has a very 
special need for the most qualified individual regardless of race.  Therefore, the military 
has been able, for the most part, to overcome the issue of discrimination.  Although, it 
must be noted that the military is not a perfect organization, and some forms of 
discrimination may exist, but they are likely to be on a much smaller scale than in the 
civilian labor market.(Tice 2000, 12) 
Because of the general inequity in the civilian labor market, the options 
for  civilian careers for minorities are more limited than options available to the majority.  
This is expected to lead more minorities to remain in the military beyond EAOS than 
individuals in the majority group.  Minorities may find better options for advancement 
and success in the military due to the military’s promotion system which is based upon 
the promoting best qualified individual. 
c. Gender 
The labor economic theory concerning gender is similar to that of race.  A 
wage earnings gap is known to exist between men and women.  In the mid-1990s, the 
average weekly earnings of women were 76% of the earnings of men.(Ehrenberg and 
Smith 2003, 587), indicating that women may be discriminated against in the civilian 
marketplace.  In the military, women receive the same earnings as their male 
counterparts.  Wage discrimination, at least, does not exist in the military.   
While wage discrimination does not exist in the military, other forms of 
gender bias do exist.  The military has historically been male dominated, with women as 
a small minority.  Presently women are not permitted to serve in combat arms specialties 
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and discussion abounds in Congress, and elsewhere, as to women’s role in combat.  
Because of these limitations, it is expected that women will be less likely than men to 
remain in the service beyond expiration of their obligated service contracts.  
d. Marital Status and Dependents at EAOS 
Marital status and dependents will have an impact on an individual’s 
employment decision.  Individuals who are married with children (MWC) or single with 
children (SWC) will have a stronger desire for stable employment situations than those 
who are single with no children due to the need and desire to support a family.  The 
Marine Corps provides a stable earnings flow, a stable future (with respect to 
employment) and an attractive retirement plan.  Thus, Marine Corps aviators are more 
likely to remain in the military if they are married or have children. 
2. Military Service Characteristics 
a. Commissioning Source 
Many commissioning sources exist for Marine Corps officers, from direct 
commissioning programs to enlisted commissioning programs.  The Marine Corps 
commissions officers through seven programs: Service Academies, Naval Reserve 
Officer Training Corps (NROTC), Platoon Leader’s Course (PLC), Officer Candidate 
Course (OCC), Marine Enlisted Commissioning Program (MECEP), Enlisted 
Commissioning Program (ECP), and Meritorious Commissioning Program (MCP).   
These programs are generally divided into direct commissioning programs 
and enlisted commissioning programs.  However, some prior enlisted Marines do attend 
the direct commissioning programs.  The direct commissioning programs are the Service 
Academies, NROTC, PLC, and OCC.  These programs are available to individuals with 
no military background.  The Service Academies and NROTC are college scholarship 
programs available to individuals entering college directly from high school.  PLC is a 
non-scholarship program offered to college students who decide to enter the Marine 
Corps while already enrolled in college.  OCC is a non-scholarship program available to 
college graduates who decide that they want to become Marine Corps officers.  The 
Service Academies and NROTC are funded by the Navy and Marine Corps and accept a 
small number of prior enlisted personnel each year. 
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The enlisted commissioning programs are MECEP, ECP, and MCP.  
MECEP is a scholarship program offered to enlisted Marines.  This program allows 
enlisted Marines to attend college full-time while continuing to serve on Active Duty in 
the Marine Corps.  These enlisted Marines attend Officer Candidate School upon 
graduation and are commissioned as Second Lieutenants in the Marine Corps.  ECP is 
designed for enlisted Marines already in possession of a college degree.  This program 
selects enlisted Marines to attend OCS and receive a commission as a Marine officer.  
The MCP program is designed for exceptional enlisted Marines not in possession of a 
college education.  These individuals are sent to OCS and receive their commissions; 
they then carry with them the obligation to obtain a college education through night 
school while on active duty. 
Each of these programs attracts different people.  The enlisted 
commissioning programs attract those individuals who have already shown a strong 
desire to serve and remain in the service.  This group of Prior Enlisted Marines also has 
already invested a great deal of time into the Marine Corps.  Therefore, this group is the 
most likely to remain in the Marine Corps for a twenty-year career.   
The direct commissioning programs attract different types of personnel.  
The Service Academies and NROTC attract individuals who have a strong desire to serve 
at a younger age than the other direct commissioning programs.  These individuals enter 
into the programs with higher expectations placed upon them by the Marine Corps than 
other directly commissioned officers due to the investment made by the service.  
Academy and NROTC graduates are the most expensive for the Marine Corps to recruit 
and train.  The PLC and OCC programs attract individuals who may have a high desire 
for service, but also who may be looking for a “jump start” on their careers.  These 
individuals are college graduates who have not determined the course of their future; they 
see military service as an opportunity to gain experience and prepare themselves for 
careers in the civilian workforce.  These individuals will be less likely to remain in the 
military than Service Academy and NROTC graduates will. 
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b. Prior Enlisted Service 
The labor economic theory of job matching applies to prior enlisted 
service Marines.  These individuals are generally older than their counterparts and have 
previous experience in the Marine Corps.   They have already displayed an affinity for 
the Marine Corps lifestyle.  Likewise, by selecting these individuals for enlisted 
commissioning programs, the Marine Corps has indicated that it is pleased with their 
performance and wants to continue their employment.   
The theory of job matching, suggests that prior enlisted Marines have 
identified themselves and been identified by the Marine Corps to be a good match for 
Marine Corps life.  Because of this, prior enlisted Marines are expected to be more likely 
to remain in the military for a career than non-prior enlisted Marine officers. 
c. ACP Amount Offered at EAOS 
The amount of ACP offered to aviators depends on the specific aircraft 
flown.  Table 4.1 shows the numeric MOS and a description of the corresponding type of 
aviator.  Table 4.2 shows that ACP has undergone many changes during the period 
covered by this study in terms of which MOS’ were offered ACP.  During FY1995, only 
F/A-18 Hornet pilots were offered ACP.  During FY1996, helicopter pilots as well as 
EA-6B Prowler pilots were excluded from receiving ACP.  FY1997 was an odd year, 
with KC-130 Hercules pilots and UH-1 helicopter pilots receiving ACP.  During FY1998 
and FY1999, all aviators were offered ACP with the exception of EA-6B pilots.  Finally, 
from FY2000 to date, all Marine Corps aviators have been offered ACP. 
The Marine Corps offers ACP to pilots as a retention incentive.  The 
amount of ACP offered has changed due to the overages or shortages observed in each 
aviation community.  From FY1995 through FY1997, the Marine Corps identified few 
shortages among aviators.  However, since then, all aviation MOS’s have been identified 
as “critical MOS’s”, and as such, are offered ACP in order to counter existing shortages. 
The amount of ACP has been determined based upon the number of 
aviators needed.  By observing the amounts offered it appears that fixed-wing pilots have 
suffered shortages since the beginning of the ACP program.  Rotary wing pilots and 
naval flight officers have not been considered as critical as fixed wing pilots.  However, 
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this changed in FY2005, with rotary wing pilots being offered the same ACP amounts as 
fixed-wing pilots.  It would appear, by observing ACP alone, that the Marine Corps 
currently is suffering from shortages of all pilots.   
It is expected that as the dollar amount of ACP offered increases, the 
number of aviators who will accept ACP and agree to extend will also increase.  
Therefore, by increasing the amount of ACP offered in FY 2005 to helicopter pilots the 
Marine Corps appears to recognize that the GWOT has had a negative effect on retention.    
Table 4.1 USMC Aviation Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) 
MOS Description 
7509 AV-8 Harrier Pilot 
7523 F/A-18 Hornet Pilot 
7525 F/A-18 Hornet Weapon System Operator (WSO) 
7531/2 MV-22 Osprey Pilot 
7543 EA-6B Prowler Pilot 
7556/7 KC-130 Hercules Pilot 
7562 CH-46 Sea Knight Pilot 
7563 UH-1 Huey Pilot 
7564 CH-53D Sea Stallion Pilot 
7565 AH-1 Cobra Pilot 
7566 CH-53E Sea Stallion Pilot 
7588 EA-6B Prowler Electronic Countermeasures Officer (ECMO) 
SOURCE:  USMC MOS Manual 
Table 4.2 FY 1995-2005 Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) 
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d. Type of Aviator 
The different aviation communities have different options in the civilian 
sector.  Naval Flight Officers have fewer options for civilian employment than do pilots.  
Fixed-wing pilots have many more options than helicopter pilots.  Fixed-wing pilots are 
enticed away from the military by increased earnings and an improved quality of life 
offered by civilian airlines.  Helicopter pilots do not have the same options and are not 
qualified to fly for the major civilian airlines.  Employment opportunities do exist for 
helicopter pilots in the civilian market, but these jobs do not offer the same earnings 
potential and benefits as the jobs available to fixed-wing pilots. 
Because of the difference in civilian opportunities between the different 
types of aircraft, each community is likely to have a unique retention pattern.  Prior to the 
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GWOT, jet pilots have had the highest probability of separating from the service.  
However, after the 9/11 attacks, the civilian airline industry’s hiring rates have fallen.  
The peak of the civilian airline industry occurred in 2000 with over 18,000 pilots hired 
and less than 600 pilots on furlough.  During the following year, 2001, the airlines hired 
over 12,000 pilots and furloughed over 6,000.  The vast majority of the 2001 furloughs 
occurred immediately after the 9/11 attacks.  Since 2001, the airlines have hired fewer 
pilots and have increased the number of pilots on furlough.  The low year for the airline 
industry came in 2003 with approximately 4,000 new hires while furloughing nearly 
10,000 pilots.(Anonymous2006, )   Because of the reduction in aviator employment, jet 
pilots have fewer opportunities in the civilian market.  Helicopter pilots have always had 
few opportunities in the civilian market; however, the helicopter industry has not changed 
since the 9/11 attacks.(Anonymous2006, )  Finally, the naval flight officer community 
has always had the fewest opportunities in the civilian market.  These aviators are simply 
not in as much demand for their aviation skills as pilots.  Therefore, naval flight officers 
are expected to be less likely than pilots to separate from the Marine Corps.  Fixed Wing 
pilots are expected to be more likely to separate from the Marine Corps than are 
helicopter pilots. 
e. Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) MOS 
Few Marine aviators are chosen to attend the Marine Corps’s Weapons 
and Tactics Instructor course.  Each year, only two classes are held with less than 120 
aviators attending each year.  These aviators are chosen to be the Weapons and Tactics 
Instructors (WTIs) for their respective squadrons.  This WTI billet is highly coveted 
among aviators.  Because of the nature of the billet, as well as the desire of aviators to 
receive this training, those aviators that are selected are generally considered “the cream 
of the crop.”  Because of the status identified with graduation from the WTI Course, it is 
expected that these aviators are more likely to remain in the Marine Corps beyond EAOS. 
f. Forward Air Controller (FAC) MOS 
Each Marine Corps infantry battalion is manned with three aviators as 
Forward Air Controllers (FACs).  This billet as a FAC has ambiguous connotations 
attached to it for aviators.  Some aviators view any billet outside of the squadron, such as 
the FAC billet, as not being career enhancing and are disgruntled when assigned to them.  
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Other aviators have a strong desire to serve with ground units as a FAC.  Because of the 
ambiguity, it is difficult to determine how FAC tours will affect retention.   
g. Number of Deployments at EAOS 
The number of deployments is identified by the DMDC PERSTEMPO 
file.  This file identifies as time deployed any day that a Marine was not physically at his 
home station, with the exception of time spent temporarily assigned to schools.  The use 
of this data in its original form does not give an accurate account of Marine Corps 
deployments.  Marines do not consider time spent in the United States as a deployment, 
but these detachments are included in the PERSTEMPO file.  Only time spent overseas 
for 90 days or greater is generally accepted as a deployment by most Marines.  The 
minimum length for a deployment is considered to be 90-days because this amount of 
time is needed to qualify for a Sea Service Deployment Ribbon, which is the primary 
indicator of having deployed.  In addition, it should be noted that the standard for a 
Marine Corps deployment is a MEU(SOC) deployment aboard ship, which lasts a 
minimum of six months.  Based on this definition of deployment, this study will only 
include and evaluate those deployments outside of the U.S. for periods of 90-days or 
greater. 
Marines would argue that the more frequently a Marine is deployed, the 
more likely it is that the Marine would separate at the end of his obligation.  This is 
because of the perceived hardship of being deployed and being separated from family.  
However, several studies have indicated that this may not be true.  These studies have 
revealed that Marines who deploy frequently are also the ones most likely to remain in 
the Corps.  The primary reason given for this is a selection bias inherent in the system.  
The studies point to self-selection and Commander selection as the reasons for this 
phenomena.(Hosek and Totten 2002, i)   
The concept of self-selection indicates that those who are deploying the 
most frequently are the Marines who want to deploy.  This explanation goes hand-in-
hand with the theory of job matching.(Ehrenberg and Smith 2003, 587)  These Marines 
are self-selecting to deploy because they enjoy deployments, which is a result of their 
satisfaction with Marine Corps life and life deployed.    
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The concept of Commander Selection is that the Unit Commander who is 
about to deploy, selects the best officers available.  The Commander wants to be 
successful and, therefore, wants to surround himself with only the best.  He would not 
order an officer to deploy if that officer did not want to do so.  Those officers who are 
selected to deploy are selected partially because of their desire to deploy.  This theory 
also is consistent with the theory of job matching, in that those officers who are selected 
are the ones who are the most compatible with the Marine Corps and have displayed 
strong performance records. 
Using the theories of self-selection, Commander selection, and job 
matching, it is likely that those individuals who deploy the most frequently will be the 
most likely to be retained.  Likewise, those who have the fewest deployments will be the 
most likely to separate. 
3. Civilian Economic Conditions 
The state of the economy has a major impact on a Marine’s decision to remain in 
the Corps.  If the economy is strong, then there will be many opportunities available in 
the civilian labor market.  If the economy is weak, then these opportunities will not be as 
readily available.  In order for a Marine aviator to be enticed into the civilian market, a 
better employment option must be available.   
a. Commercial Airline Industry 
The commercial airline industry is a significant factor in the aviator’s 
retention decision.  The commercial airline industry offers what is perceived as a better 
lifestyle with better compensation and benefits.  Because of this, the airline industry 
appeals to many military pilots.  The peak of the civilian airline industry occurred in 2000 
with over 18,000 pilots hired and less than 600 pilots on furlough.  The following year 
began a decline in pilots being hired and a corresponding increase in the number of pilots 
being furloughed. Since 2001, the airlines have hired fewer pilots and have increased the 
number of pilots on furlough.(Anonymous2006, )   Because of the reduction in civilian 
aviation employment, pilots have fewer opportunities in the civilian market.  However, 
the limited opportunities available for pilots remain enticing to military pilots.  The 
number of pilots hired by the airline industry will most likely affect the decision of 
 48
Marine aviators to stay or leave the service.  As the number of pilots hired by the 
commercial airline industry increases, the number of Marine aviators who separate will 
most likely also increase. 
4. Global War on Terror 
Wartime is both the most difficult and most rewarding time for service members.  
During wartime, service members suffer through long and frequent deployments.  
However, these individuals are performing the jobs that they entered the service and were 
trained to perform.  Everyone enters the military with an understanding that he or she 
may be called upon to participate in armed conflict. 
Marines are a special breed.  Marines distinguish themselves from the other 
services with their esprit de corps and will to fight.  Individuals enter into the Corps with 
the belief that the United States Marine Corps is the finest fighting force in the world.  
They also have an understanding of the history and legacy of the Marine Corps and hope 
to uphold that history and legacy.  Marines are expected to want the opportunity to prove 
themselves in combat.  Therefore, the Marine Corps, perhaps more so than any other 
service, is strongest during times of war.  Because of the nature of the Marine Corps, it 
would be expected that those Marines who have experienced combat will be more likely 
to be retained than those who have never seen combat. 
While Marines are proud to serve and fight this nation’s battles, there is a limit to 
the deprivation they, or their families, can withstand.  The Global War on Terror is a 
prolonged war that has no end in sight.  Marines are deploying more frequently than at 
any other time in the last twenty years.  The increased OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO 
coupled with the indefinite period of the GWOT have worn on many Marines.  The same 
Marines who hunger for battle are now weary from two, three, or more combat tours in 
Iraq or Afghanistan.  Because of potential exhaustion, it is expected that Marines who 
have served in the GWOT will be more likely to separate.  It is hypothesized that 
individuals with the most GWOT deployments will be the most likely to separate. 
C. SUMMARY 
This study evaluates the retention decisions of Marine Corps aviators between 
October 1994 and June 2005.  It observes the “survival” of these aviators six months 
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beyond their Expiration of Obligated Service (EAOS) date.  This six-month survival 
period allows for standardization across the entire period and also allows for an 
evaluation of the current retention decisions of Marine aviators.  A Marine aviator’s 
retention decision is evaluated based upon variables related to personal characteristics, 
military service characteristics, civilian economic conditions, and the Global War on 
Terror.  Table 4.3 shows the expected relationship between each independent variable 
and the dependent variable, retention. 
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Table 4.3 Explanatory Variables and Expected Effects on Retention 
Variable Variable Type Expected Sign 
Age at EAOS Continuous Positive 
White Binary Base 
Minority Binary Positive 
Male Binary Base Case 
Female Binary Negative 
Single with no children (SNC) Binary Base Case 
Single with children (SWC) Binary Negative 
Married with no children (MNC) Binary Negative 
Married with Children (MWC) Binary Negative 
Service Academy  Binary Base Case 
Officer Candidate School (OCS) Binary Positive 
ROTC Binary Positive 
Prior Enlisted Service Binary Positive 
Present Value of ACP (PV_thou) Continuous Positive 
Fixed-Wing Pilot (FWP) Binary Base Case 
Rotary-Wing Pilot (RWP) Binary Negative 
Naval Flight Officer (NFO) Binary Negative 
Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) Binary Positive 
Forward Air Controller (FAC) Binary Unknown 
Airline Hires (Hires_thou) Continuous Negative 
Zero Deployments (D0) Binary Base Case 
One Deployment (D1) Binary Positive 
Two Deployments (D2) Binary Positive 
≥ 2 Deployments (D3) Binary Positive 
Zero Non-Hostile Deployments (N0) Binary Base Case 
One Non-Hostile Deployments (N1) Binary Positive 
≥ 2 Non-Hostile Deployments (N23) Binary Positive 
Zero Hostile Deployments (H0) Binary Base Case 
One Hostile Deployment (H1) Binary Positive 
≥ 2 Hostile Deployments (H23) Binary Positive 
0 Non- and 0 Hostile Deployments 
(N0H0) 
Binary Positive 
0 Non- and ≥  1Hostile Deployment 
(N0H) 
Binary Base Case 
1 Non- and 0 Hostile Deployments 
(N1H0) 
Binary Positive 
1 Non- and ≥  1Hostile Deployment 
(N1H) 
Binary Positive 
≥2 Non- and 0 Hostile Deployments 
(N23H0) 
Binary Positive 
≥2 Non- and ≥  1Hostile Deployment 
(N23H) 
Binary Positive 





V. POOLED DEPLOYMENT MODEL RESULTS 
A. DEPLOYMENT MODELS  
Initially the data for the Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 (GWOT) periods were pooled and 
a single logit model was estimated.  This model includes the variables indicated in 
Chapter III.  The key variables for this model were the total deployments variables D0, 
D1, D2, and D3, as well as the dummy variable GWOT.  This model is labeled as the 
“Total Deployments” model.  Subsequently, separate logistic regression models were run 
for the Pre-9/11 and GWOT groups.  
The deployment variables were constructed using the definition of deployment 
presented in Chapter IV in order to identify whether an individual had no deployments 
(D0), one deployment (D1), two deployments (D2), or more than two deployments (D3).  
This model does not differentiate between hostile and non-hostile deployments.  The 
effects of the total deployments variables allow for an evaluation of the influence that 
OPTEMPO has on retention. 
A second logistic regression model was developed to evaluate the effects of non-
hostile and hostile deployments.  Six deployment-type variables identify whether an 
individual has experienced zero non-hostile deployments (N0), one non-hostile 
deployment (N1), multiple non-hostile deployments (N23), zero hostile deployments 
(H0), one hostile deployment (H1), or multiple hostile deployments (H23).  The effect of 
each of these deployment-type variables allows for a more precise evaluation of the effect 
that increased OPTEMPO has on retention.  These variables were created based upon the 
Hosek and Totten (2002) RAND study evaluating the effect of deployments on retention 
in all four of the Services.  This model is labeled as the “Non Interacted” model.  
Subsequently, separate logistic regression models that included the non-interacted 
deployment-type variables were run for the Pre-9/11 and GWOT groups.   
A final logistic regression model was developed to better evaluate the effect of 
non-hostile and hostile deployments.  The deployment-type variables from the “Non 
Interacted” model are combined to create interaction terms.  The interaction variables 
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identify whether an individual has zero non-hostile and zero hostile deployments (N0H0), 
zero non-hostile and at least one hostile deployment, (N0H), one non-hostile and zero 
hostile deployments (N1H0), one non-hostile and at least one hostile deployment (N1H), 
multiple non-hostile and zero hostile deployments (N23H0), and multiple non-hostile and 
at least one hostile deployments (N23H).  The effect of each of the interacted 
deployment-type variables allows for an even more precise evaluation of the effect that 
increased OPTEMPO has on retention.  These variables were created based upon the 
Hosek and Totten (2002) RAND study evaluating the effect of deployments on retention 
in all four of the Services.  This model is labeled as the “Interacted” model.  
Subsequently, separate logistic regression models that include the interacted deployment-
type variables were run for the Pre-9/11 and GWOT groups.   
The dummy variable GWOT was created based upon the Post-9/11 (GWOT) 
group.  This variable is an indicator of Marine aviators whose Expiration of Active 
Obligated Service (EAOS) occurred between October 2001 and June 2005.  This variable 
is included in each of the pooled models and allows for an evaluation of the effect that 
the Global War on Terror (GWOT) has had on the retention behavior of Marine aviators.  
When evaluated in conjunction with the effect of the deployment-type variables, the 
effect that the increased OPTEMPO resulting from the GWOT has had on the retention of 
Marine Corps aviators can be determined. 
B. RETENTION OF POOLED MARINE AVIATORS (1995-2005) 
1. Model Goodness of Fit 
a. Global Null Hypothesis 
In order to determine the “goodness of fit” of a model, there are three 
distinct criteria to be evaluated, the first of which is the Global Null Hypothesis, which 
tests for the overall significance of the logit model.  The Global Null Hypothesis states 
that none of the explanatory variables in the model has an effect on the dependent 
variable ‘stay’.  The alternative hypothesis is that at least one of the explanatory variables 
has an effect on the variation in the dependent variable. 
In order to determine whether to accept the Global Null Hypothesis or 
reject it for a logistic regression model, one must evaluate the Likelihood Ratio based on 
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the Chi-Square statistic.  As shown in Table 5.1, the Likelihood Ratios for the pooled 
models are all significant at the .01 level.  Therefore, it can be concluded that at least one 
of the explanatory variables is significant in explaining the variation in the dependent 
variable for all three pooled models.   
Table 5.1 Global Null Hypothesis Test for Pooled Logit Models 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA = 0 
Model Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared DF Pr>ChiSq 
Total Deployments 1834.145 660.1122 20 <.0001 
Non-Interacted 1847.83 646.4272 21 <.0001 
Interacted 1833.303 660.9550 22 <.0001 
Source: Author 
b. R-Square 
A second goodness of fit criterion is the Generalized R-Square and the 
Max-Rescaled R-Square of the model.  The Generalized R-Square is defined as the 
fraction of the variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the independent 
variables.  In a logistic regression model, the Generalized R-Square value has an upper 
bound that is less than one because of the dependent variable being discrete.  The Max-
Rescaled R-Square adjusts the Generalized R-Square and allows for a maximum value of 
one and, therefore, the Max-Rescaled R-Square value is preferred.  
As shown in Table 5.2, the Generalized R-Square values are 
approximately 0.21 and the Max-Rescaled R-Square values are approximately 0.35 for 
the three models.  This indicates that approximately 35% of the variation in the ‘stay’ 
variable is related to the variation in the dependent variables in the each of the three 
pooled models.   
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Table 5.2 Generalized R-Square and Max-Rescaled R-Square for the Pooled 
Logit Models 
Model Generalized R-Square Max-Rescaled R-Square 
Total Deployments 0.2126 0.3575 
Non Interactive 0.2087 0.3509 
Interactive 0.2128 0.3579 
Source: Author 
c. Classification Table 
A third method used to determine goodness of fit is the Classification 
Table, which determines the accuracy of the prediction by comparing the predicted 
outcomes with the actual results.  As Table 5.3 indicates, the pooled models correctly 
classify approximately 72.5% of the individuals in each of the three models based upon a 
probability cut-off level of 0.840, which corresponds to the actual proportion of ‘stayers’ 
among the Marine aviators included in the model.  “Sensitivity” indicates the percentage 
of the ‘stayers’ in the sample that were correctly predicted as staying.  As Table 5.3 
indicates, these models correctly classify approximately 69.5% of the ‘stayers’ in each of 
the three pooled models.  “Specificity” indicates the percentage of leavers in the sample 
that are correctly predicted as separating.  As Table 5.3 indicates, these models correctly 
classify approximately 88.4% of those who separated in each of the three pooled models.  
Table 5.3 Classification Table for the Pooled Logit Models 













0.840 1602 409 53 698 72.8 69.7 88.5 3.2 63.1 
Non 
Interacted 
0.840 1591 408 54 709 72.4 69.2 88.3 3.3 63.5 




2. Interpretation and Evaluation of Coefficients 
Of the 20 variables used in the Pooled Total Deployments Regression Model, 15 
are statistically significant.  Of the 21 variables used in the Pooled Non-Interacted 
Regression Model, 16 are statistically significant.  Of the 22 variables used in the Pooled 
Interacted Regression Model, 18 are statistically significant.  The variables and 
significance levels are shown in Table 5.4.  The results shown are for a one-tailed test, 
with the exception of the FAC variable that uses a two-tailed test.  These variables are 
evaluated with a one-tailed test in order to evaluate the hypotheses stated in Chapter IV.  
Since the FAC variable did not have a hypothesized effect, a two-tailed test will allows us 
to determine the sign of any effect that may be present. 
Table 5.4 Logit Results for Pooled Data (N=2,762) 








Age -0.8870 0.03755** -0.9529 0.0269** -0.8877 0.03765** 
Age Squared  0.0114 0.05655* 0.0124 0.04105* 0.0114 0.05655* 
Minority 0.1105 0.3390 0.1007 0.3515 0.1242 0.3207 
Female 0.2199 0.2963 0.2230 0.2927 0.1802 0.3304 
MWC 0.2936 0.0191** 0.3227 0.0111** 0.3018 0.22935 
MNC 0.1467 0.0879* 0.1428 0.20865 0.1314 0.03945** 
SWC 1.1621 0.0365** 1.0877 0.04605** 1.1385 <.0001*** 
ROTC 0.1223 0.2966 0.0942 0.33995 0.1133 0.3108 
OCS 0.4619 0.0047*** 0.4304 0.00765*** 0.4455 0.0062*** 
Prior_Enl 0.4161 0.1498 0.4286 0.07575* 0.4554 0.06495* 
RWP -1.2767 <0.0001*** -1.2997 <0.0001*** -1.2824 <0.0001*** 
NFO -1.3513 <0.0001*** -1.3820 <0.0001*** -1.3472 <0.0001*** 
WTI 0.7969 <0.0001*** 0.8111 <0.0001*** 0.7978 <0.0001*** 
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FAC# 0.2557 0.1029 0.2633 0.1909 0.2617 0.1947 
PV_thou 0.0105 <0.0001*** 0.0102 <0.0001*** 0.0106 <0.0001*** 
Hires_thou -0.1579 <0.0001*** -0.1584 <0.0001*** -0.1601 <0.0001*** 
GWOT -3.3765 <0.0001*** -3.3571 <0.0001*** -3.3880 <0.0001*** 
D1 -0.8969 <0.0001***     
D2 -0.5445 0.0011***     
D3 -0.6099 0.0006***     
N1   -0.2010 0.07155*   
N23   -0.2801 0.07085*   
H1   -0.3867 0.0050***   
H23   -0.2065 0.0768*   
N0H     -0.6527 0.0001*** 
N1H0     -1.1064 <0.0001*** 
N1H     -0.5577 0.00225*** 
N23H0     -0.5703 0.0220** 
N23H     -0.8392 0.0013*** 
SOURCE: Author  *** Significant at the .01 level  **Significant at the .05 level *Significant at the .10 level 
   # Coefficients shown are for a two-tailed test. 
 
The AGE variable is statistically significant in all three pooled models and its 
effect on a Marine aviator’s decision to stay is negative.  The AGE SQUARED variable is 
also significant, but is positive in its effect on the retention decision.  These variables are 
also jointly significant in all three pooled models, which leads to the conclusion that age 
has a negative but diminishing effect on retention up to a certain point after which the 
effect becomes positive.  For all three models, age has a negative effect on retention until 
the aviator reaches 39 years of age, the turning point for the quadratic equation.  Once an 
aviator reaches 39 years of age, the likelihood to remain in the Marine Corps increases as 
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his age increases.  It is possible that once a Marine reaches this age, he desires more 
stability because of family responsibilities and may assume that he has reached a point in 
his military career at which a change of employment is not a practical option. 
Most of the marital status and dependency variables are significant.  The variable 
for single with children (SWC) is significant and positive in all three pooled models, 
indicating that single parents are more likely to stay than are single Marines with no 
dependents.  The married with children (MWC) variable is also positive and significant in 
the Pooled Total Deployments and Pooled Non-Interacted Models, but is not significant 
in the Pooled Interacted Model.  This indicates that those aviators who are married and 
have children are more likely to stay than are single Marines without children.  Finally, 
the variable for married without children (MNC) is significant in the Pooled Total 
Deployments and Pooled Interacted Models indicating that those aviators who are 
married and have no children are more likely to stay than single Marines with no 
children.  Marital status and dependency may be significant because individuals with 
dependents are likely to have a stronger desire for stable employment situations than 
those who are single with no children.  This may be due to the need and desire to support 
a family.   
The commissioning source variables are jointly significant in the pooled models, 
indicating that commissioning source affect on the retention decision.  The base case is 
the variable ACADEMY; ROTC and OCS graduates are compared to ACADEMY 
graduates.  ROTC graduates are not significantly different from ACADEMY graduates in 
their retention behavior.  This may be because ROTC graduates are similar to Academy 
graduates in that they have recognized a desire to serve early in their collegiate education.  
OCS graduates, however, show a significantly higher likelihood to stay than ACADEMY 
graduates.  This appears to be explained by the inclusion of Enlisted Commissioning 
Programs in this category.  It was not possible to separate those individuals who 
participated in Enlisted Commissioning Programs from all others who attended Officer 
Candidate School.  Therefore, it is likely that the number of prior enlisted Marines 
affected the results for all OCS graduates.   
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The PRIOR_ENL variable is positive and significant in the Pooled Non-Interacted 
and Interacted Models, indicating that having prior enlisted service increases the retention 
probability.  The positive and significant effect of prior enlisted service on an aviator’s 
retention behavior is most likely due to the matching theory.  These aviators have already 
displayed an affinity for the Marine Corps lifestyle indicated by their choosing to 
transition from the enlisted ranks to the officer ranks, thus increasing their service 
commitment.  Likewise, by selecting these individuals for commissioning programs, the 
Marine Corps has indicated that it is satisfied with their performance and wants to 
continue their employment. 
The type of aviator variables are jointly significant in all three pooled models, 
indicating that the type of aviator affects retention.  The base case for this variable is 
FIXED WING PILOT (FWP), with which ROTARY WING PILOTS (RWP) and NAVAL 
FLIGHT OFFICERS (NFO) are compared.  Both RWP and NFO are individually 
significant as well as jointly significant.  Both variables also have a negative effect on 
retention behavior.  This can be explained because of the service obligation and the time-
to-train.  ROTARY WING PILOTS and NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICERS incur a six-year 
service obligation upon being designated as naval aviators, while FIXED WING PILOTS 
incur an eight-year obligation.  ROTARY WING PILOTS and NAVAL FLIGHT 
OFFICERS undergo two years or less of training, while FIXED WING PILOTS undergo 
more than two years of training.  This difference in time-to-train coupled with the length 
of the service obligation means that FIXED WING PILOTS will be older and have more 
time-in-service than other aviators when the retention decision is made.  Therefore, it is 
understandable that ROTARY WING PILOTS and NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICERS are more 
likely to separate than FIXED WING PILOTS.  
The WTI variable is positive and significant in the pooled models, indicating that 
the Weapons and Tactics MOS has a positive effect on the retention decision.  Those 
individuals who obtain the Additional MOS as WTIs are the most highly trained aviators 




and generally rewards these individuals with choice assignments.  As a result, individuals 
with the WTI MOS are more likely to be satisfied and choose to stay in the Marine Corps 
than others. 
The present value of the future annual payments of Aviation Continuation Pay 
(PV_THOU) is positive and significant in the pooled models, indicating that the aviation 
bonus has a positive effect on the retention decision of aviators.  The average present 
value of ACP for the pooled aviators is $40,976. 
The HIRES_thou variable is significant and negative in the pooled models, 
indicating that the number of annual airline hires has a negative effect on the retention of 
Marine Corps aviators.  This may be caused by the benefits associated with employment 
in the civilian airline industry.  The civilian airline industry offers better wages and more 
flexible schedules than the military.  This pay differential and flexibility in scheduling 
appears to entice aviators into separating. 
The dummy variable GWOT is significant and negative, indicating that the Global 
War on Terror has had a negative effect on the retention of Marine Corps aviators.  This 
negative effect is most likely the result of the increased OPTEMPO and hazardous duty 
required of those Marines serving since the GWOT began.  The relatively high 
coefficient associated with the dummy variable GWOT is most likely explained by the 
differences between the portion Pre-9/11 and GWOT aviators who chose to stay.  Pre-
9/11 aviators have a much higher proportion of ‘stayers’ than GWOT aviators, 97% and 
66%, respectively.  The high coefficient is most likely attributable to this difference in 
proportions. 
For the Pooled Total Deployments Model, the deployment variables are both 
jointly and individually significant, as well as negative in effect.  This indicates that 
deployments have a negative effect on retention.  The base case for this variable is zero 
deployments (D0).  These deployment variables indicate that as the number of 
deployments increases, the likelihood of separating also increases.  The largest effect 
results from one deployment (D1 = -0.8969).  The next largest effect results from more 
than two deployments (D3 = -0.6099), which has a larger effect than two deployments 
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(D2 = -0.5445).  Deployments most likely negatively affect an aviator’s decision to stay 
due to the perceived hardship of being deployed and being separated from family.  After 
the first deployment, Marines learn about the deployment and separation experiences.  
The hardship associated with deploying is likely to be the reason that many aviators 
choose to separate rather than continue to deploy.   
For the Pooled Non-Interacted Model, non-hostile and hostile deployments are 
tested independently.  The base case for non-hostile deployments is zero non-hostile 
deployments.  Both of the non-hostile variables are negative and significant indicating 
that the number of non-hostile deployments has a negative effect on the retention 
decision of Marine aviators in the pooled period.  The most likely explanation for the 
negative effect of non-hostile deployments is the presence of significant stressors related 
to family separation.  When a Marine is separated from his family, he has a certain 
amount of stress associated with concern for the well-being of family members left 
behind, which may have a negative effect on a Marine’s desire to deploy.  If a Marine 
does not want to deploy, even under non-hostile conditions, then he is most likely 
identifying himself as not being satisfied and being incompatible with the Marine Corps 
life. 
For the Pooled Non-Interacted Model, the base case for hostile deployments is 
zero hostile deployments.  The hostile deployment variables indicating one hostile 
deployment (H1) and multiple hostile deployments (H23) are also both negative and 
significant, indicating that the number of hostile deployments has a negative effect on the 
retention decision of Marine aviators.  The most likely explanation for this is the stressors 
and hardships related to hostile deployments.  Hostile deployments indicate that an 
individual participated in combat operations and most likely came under fire by hostile 
forces, while non-hostile deployments are generally benign.  The stress related to daily 
combat operations coupled with the Spartan living conditions associated with combat 
zones appear to lead aviators to separate. 
For the Pooled Interacted Model, all of the interacted variables are individually 
significant as well as jointly significant.  These interacted variables show that 
deployments have a negative effect on the Marine aviator’s retention decision.  The base 
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case is an individual with zero deployments.  Each of the interacted deployment variables 
shows that deployments have a negative effect on retention.  The largest effect is for 
individuals with one non-hostile and zero hostile deployments (N1H0).  The next largest 
effect is for those who have multiple non-hostile deployments and at least one hostile 
deployment (N23H), followed by those with zero hostile and at least one hostile 
deployment (N0H), one non-hostile and at least one hostile deployment (N1H), and 
multiple non-hostile and zero hostile deployments (N23H0).  Marines who deploy most 
frequently to combat zones are the most likely to separate.  This is largely due to the 
extreme hardship and stress endured during combat deployments.  Non-hostile 
deployments generally occur aboard a comfortable ship at sea, while hostile deployments 
occur in harsh areas with minimal comfort and support available and include an increased 
risk of death.  Therefore, the hostile deployments, in general a greater negative effect on 
retention. 
3. Partial Effects 
a. Notional Person (Base Case) 
The notional person approach is used to calculate the partial effect of each 
explanatory variable on the probability of retention.  The notional person is assigned the 
mean value for the continuous variables and a value of zero for all binary variables.  
Once the notional person’s individual characteristics are established, each explanatory 
variable can be altered to determine its partial effect on the retention probability.  This is 
done by increasing the value of each variable while holding the other variables constant 
at their mean value and calculating the effect on the probability of retention. 
For the Pooled Sample group, the notional person has an 83.27% 
probability of staying in the Marine Corps.  The notional person in the Pooled Sample 
group is 32.5 years old, white, male, single with no children, a service academy graduate, 
not prior enlisted, a Fixed-Wing Pilot, with 11 years of service, no deployments, received 
$40,976 of ACP, and 3,880 airline pilots were hired the year of his EAOS. 
b. Partial Effects 
Table 5.5 shows the partial effects of all significant variables in the Pooled 
Sample group logistic regression models.  The notional person (base case) has a 
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probability of staying of 83.27%.  For an aviator with the same characteristics as the 
notional person but one year older, the likelihood of staying is reduced by 1.39 
percentage points for the Deployment Model, 1.94 percentage points when using the 
Non-Interacted Model, and 1.35 percentage points when using the Interacted Model. 
For an aviator who is married with children, the likelihood of staying 
increases by a mere 0.3 percentage points over an aviator who is single with no children.  
An aviator who is married with no children has a likelihood of staying that is 0.13 
percentage points higher than an aviator who is single with no children.  Also, an aviator 
who is a single parent is 0.7 percentage points more likely to stay than a single aviator 
with no children.  An OCS graduate will have an increased likelihood of staying of 0.4 
percentage points over the notional person, who is a Service Academy graduate. 
Rotary Wing Pilots and Naval Flight Officers have an increased likelihood 
of staying of approximately 3.0 percentage points over Fixed Wing Pilots (who are the 
base case).  Those pilots who have the WTI MOS have an increased likelihood of staying 
of approximately 0.5 percentage points.   
The economic factors that affect the probability of staying are the Present 
Value of Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP and the annual number of pilots hired by the 
commercial airline industry.  For every $1,000 in present value of ACP that an aviator 
receives above the mean ($40,976), the likelihood of staying increases by .008 percentage 
points, and for every 1,000 pilots hired by the airline industry above 3,380 pilots, the 
likelihood of an aviator staying decreases by approximately .15 percentage points. 
The pooled model results indicate that deployments have a negative 
impact on a Marine aviator’s retention decision.  The notional person had been deployed 
zero times.  Those aviators who have one deployment are 1.46 percentage points less 
likely to stay than those with no deployments.  Those aviators with two deployments and 
those with more than two deployments have a decreased likelihood of staying of 0.739 
and 0.388 percentage points, respectively.   
The notional person in the Pooled Non-Interacted Model has zero non-
hostile deployments and zero hostile deployments.  Aviators with one non-hostile 
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deployment are 0.29 percentage points less likely to stay than aviators with no non-
hostile deployments.  Aviators with multiple non-hostile deployments are 0.42 percentage 
points less likely to stay than the notional person.  Aviators with one hostile deployment 
have a likelihood of staying that is 0.1 percentage points lower than those who have zero 
hostile deployments.  Aviators with multiple hostile deployments have a likelihood of 
staying that is 0.09 percentage points less than the notional person. 
The base case in the Pooled Interacted Model is an aviator with zero 
deployments.  Those aviators with zero non-hostile deployments and at least one hostile 
deployment are 0.91 percentage points less likely to stay than aviators with no 
deployments.  Aviators with one non-hostile and no hostile deployments have a 
likelihood of staying that is 1.96 percentage points lower than those who have never 
deployed.  Aviators with one non-hostile and at least one hostile deployments have a 
decreased likelihood of staying of 0.3 percentage points.  Aviators with multiple non-
hostile and zero hostile deployments are 0.55 percentage points less likely to stay than 
those with zero deployments. Finally, aviators with multiple non-hostile and at least one 
hostile deployments have a likelihood of staying that is 1.0 percentage points lower than 
an aviator who has never deployed. 
Table 5.5 Partial Effects for Pooled Logit Models  




Age -0.01386** -0.01944** -0.01346** 
OCS +0.00367*** +0.00437*** +0.00344*** 
RWP -0.02596*** -0.03389*** -0.02545*** 
NFO -0.02865*** -0.03771*** -0.02773*** 
WTI +0.00556*** +0.00715*** +0.00538*** 
PV_thou +0.00011*** +0.00013*** +0.00010*** 
Hires_thou -0.00174*** -0.00222*** -0.00172*** 
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MNC +0.00139*  +0.00122** 
MWC +0.00255** +0.00352**  
SWC +0.00697** +0.00855** +0.00668*** 
GWOT -0.19768*** -0.23537*** -0.19731*** 
D1 -0.01463***   
D2 -0.00739***   
D3 -0.00388***   
N1  -0.00287*  
N23  -0.00420*  
H1  -0.00097***  
H23  -0.00089*  
N0H   -0.00907*** 
N1H0   -0.01963*** 
N1H   -0.00298*** 
N23H0   -0.00547** 
N23H   -0.01009*** 
 SOURCE: Author  *** Significant at the .01 level  **Significant at the .05 level *Significant at the .10 level 
 
C. POOLED RESULTS SUMMARY 
The sample for the Pooled Model consists of all Marine Corps aviators who were 
eligible to separate between October 1994 and June 2005.  This sample includes both 
Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 aviators.  The size of the sample is 2,762 aviators.  The results of 
the pooled models show that deployments have a negative effect on the retention decision 
irrespective of whether they are hostile or non-hostile deployments.  The fact that an 
individual is separated from his or her family while on deployment has historically been a 
factor in the retention decision.   
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The results of this study are different from the results of previous research.  The 
Hosek and Totten (2002) RAND study took a similar approach to evaluating non-hostile 
and hostile deployments.  Hosek and Totten (2002) found that when analyzed 
independently, non-hostile and hostile deployments have a positive effect on retention of 
service members(Hosek, James 2002, 106).  Their research also showed that when non-
hostile and hostile deployments are interacted with each other, there is a positive 
relationship between deployments and retention.(Hosek 2002, 108)  These results are 
different from the results of this thesis.  While Hosek and Totten (2002) found a positive 
relationship between deployment and retention, this thesis shows that the relationship is 
actually negative.  Hosek and Totten’s (2002) approach differs from this thesis in two 
important areas: the definition of deployment and the time period evaluated.  They 
defined a deployment as any indication of Family Separation Allowance or Imminent 
Danger Pay.  While these special pays do indicate that the service member was away 
from home for at least 30-days, they do not indicate whether the service member was 
participating in an OCONUS deployment or a CONUS training exercise.  The 
psychological impact on the service member greatly differs between OCONUS 
deployments and CONUS training exercises, with OCONUS deployments having a much 
greater psychological effect.  Also, the Hosek and Totten (2002) study evaluated 
retention behavior in the 1990s.  While the 1990s may be indicative of previous decades, 
this period should not be used to evaluate the GWOT era.  The 1990s were a period of 
relative stability throughout the world, while the GWOT era is recognized as being 
relatively unstable.  Therefore, it is not appropriate to use the results of 1990s behavior in 
order to predict behavior in the GWOT period. 
Other key factors in the retention of aviators in the pooled sample are the type of 
aviator, WTI MOS, and Aviation Continuation Pay.  RWPs and NFOs are more likely to 
separate than FWPs.  Part of the reason that RWPs are more likely to separate than FWPs 
is due to their OPTEMPO.  RWPs can expect to deploy more frequently than FWPs.  
Since deployments have a negative effect on retention on the sample as a whole, it is 
understandable why RWPs would be separating at a higher rate than FWPs.   
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The WTI MOS is another issue that is identifiable in the pooled sample.  As stated 
earlier, the WTI MOS is the equivalent to “Top Gun” for Marine pilots.  Those 
individuals who possess this MOS have more qualifications than other pilots.  Usually 
there is a significant divide between a WTI and the average pilot in the squadron with 
respect to qualifications.  The average pilot has minimal qualifications and cannot 
perform certain missions, while the WTI has every qualification and can perform all 
missions.  This creates a feeling of frustration among many pilots who feel capable, and 
are capable, of performing most missions required.   
Finally, Aviation Continuation Pay continues to be a factor in the retention 
decision.  The Department of Defense initiated the ACP program in order to increase 
retention of aviators.  This was done after studies showed that paying aviators a bonus 
would be an effective retention tool.  Therefore, it was expected that ACP would have an 
effect on the retention decision.  For the pooled model, the effect is not very large, but it 
is still positive.  ACP is an effective tool and will continue to be an effective tool to 

























VI. PRE-9/11 AND POST-9/11 (GWOT) DEPLOYMENT MODELS 
RESULTS (SECOND REVISION) 
A. DEPLOYMENT MODELS 
In order to evaluate the determinants of retention in the periods before and after 
the Global War on Terror, the data are separated into Pre-9/11 and Post-9/11 (GWOT) 
samples.  For each sub-sample the same three deployment models are estimated as for the 
pooled data.  The first model for each time period is the Total Deployments Model, 
which estimates the effects of the total number of deployments by using indicators for 
one deployment (D1), two deployments (D2), and more than two deployments (D3).  The 
second model for each time period is the Non-Interacted Model, which estimates the 
independent effects of non-hostile and hostile deployments (N1, N23, H1, and H23).  The 
final model for each time period is the Interacted Model, which estimates the combined 
effects of non-hostile and hostile deployments (N0H, N1H0, N1H, N23H0, and N23H).   
B. RETENTION OF PRE-9/11/2001 MARINE AVIATORS 
1. Model Goodness of Fit 
a. Global Null Hypothesis 
The Global Null Hypothesis tests for the overall significance of the logit 
model.  The Global Null Hypothesis is that none of the explanatory variables in the 
model has an effect on the dependent variable ‘stay’.  The alternative hypothesis is that at 
least one of the explanatory variables has an effect on the variation in the dependent 
variable.  As shown in Table 6.1, the Likelihood Ratios for the Pre-9/11 models are all 
significant at the .10 level.  Therefore, it can be concluded that at least one of the 
explanatory variables is significant in explaining the variation in the dependent variable 
for each of the three Pre-9/11 models.   
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Table 6.1 Global Null Hypothesis Test for Pre-9/11 Logit Models 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA = 0 
Model Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared DF Pr>ChiSq 
Total Deployments 364.085 27.9288 18 0.0631 
Non Interacted 360.939 31.0743 19 0.0396 
Interacted 348.997 43.0167 20 0.0020 
SOURCE: Author 
b. R-Square 
A second goodness of fit criterion is the Generalized R-Square and Max-
Rescaled R-Square of the model.  As shown in Table 6.2, the Generalized R-Square 
values are 0.0181, 0.0201, and 0.0277, respectively, for the three models.  The Max-
Rescaled R-Square values for the Pre-9/11 models are 0.0800, 0.0899, and 0.1226.  This 
indicates that between 8.0% and 12.26% of the variation in the ‘stay’ variable is related 
to the variation in the dependent variables in each of the three Pre-9/11 models. 
Table 6.2 Generalized R-Square and Max-Rescaled R-Square for the Pre-9/11 
Logit Models 
Model Generalized R-Square Max-Rescaled R-Square 
Total Deployments 0.0181 0.0800 
Non Interacted 0.0201 0.0899 
Interacted 0.0277 0.1226 
SOURCE: Author 
c. Classification Table 
A third method used to determine goodness of fit is the Classification 
Table.  As Table 6.3 indicates, the Pre-9/11 models correctly classify 46.8%, 48.5%, and 
51.7% of the individuals based upon a probability cut-off level of 0.980, which 
corresponds to the actual proportion of “stayers” among the aviators included in the 
models.  “Sensitivity” indicates the percentage of the ‘stayers’ in the sample that are 
correctly predicted as staying.  As Table 6.3 indicates, these models correctly classify 
46.0%, 47.8%, and 51.2% of the ‘stayers’ in each of the three Pre-9/11 models.  
“Specificity” indicates the percentage of separators in the sample that are correctly 
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predicted as separating.  As Table 6.3 indicates, these models correctly classify 72.1%, 
69.8%, and 67.4% of those who separated in each of the three Pre-9/11 models. 
Table 6.3 Classification Table for the Pre-9/11 Logit Models 













0.980 685 31 12 803 46.8 46.0 72.1 1.7 96.3 
Non 
Interacted 
0.980 712 30 13 776 48.5 47.8 69.8 1.8 96.3 
Interacted 0.980 762 29 14 726 51.7 51.2 67.4 1.8 96.2 
SOURCE: Author 
2. Interpretation and Evaluation of Coefficients 
Of the 18 variables used in the Pre-9/11 Total Deployments Regression Model, 
three are statistically significant.  Of the 19 variables used in the Pre-9/11 Non-Interacted 
Regression Model, three are statistically significant.  Of the 20 variables used in the Pre-
9/11 Interacted Regression Model, four are statistically significant.  The variables and 
significance levels are shown in Table 6.4.  The results shown are for a one-tailed test, 
with the exception of the FAC variable that uses a two-tailed test.   
Table 6.4 Logit Results for Pre-9/11 Data (N=1,531) 








Age -0.0700 0.4741 -0.0304 0.48885 -0.1039 0.4627 
Age Squared -0.00200 0.4491 -0.00250 0.43685 -0.00161 0.4601 
Minority -0.2979 0.3458 -0.3595 0.3160 -0.3884 0.30335 
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ROTC -0.0246 0.48355 -0.0204 0.4863 -0.1119 0.4260 
OCS 0.2818 0.2776 0.3423 0.23665 0.2533 0.30045 
Prior_Enl 0.8643 0.2101 0.8893 0.2037 1.0173 0.1728 
RWP 0.5444 0. 3007 0.5481 0.30085 0.4638 0.3232 
NFO 1.2866 0.13935 1.2167 0.15495 1.1292 0.1644 
WTI 1.4081 0.0279** 1.4158 0.0273** 1.4391 0.02565** 
FAC# 0.2581 0.6790 0.3383 0.5860 0.3422 0.5844 
PV_thou -0.00490 0.15905 -0.00589 0.1144 -0.00533 0.1413 
Hires_thou 0.0272 0.3749 0.0233 0.39395 0.0115 0.4448 
MWC 0.5922 0.0527* 0.5868 0.0546 -0.8116 0.0329** 
MNC 0.3346 0.2233 0.2657 0.27395 0.2400 0.2949 
SWC 0.2686 0.4012 0.2845 0.39535 0.2518 0.40775 
D1 -0.2331 0.27525     
D2 0.7447 0.05605*     
D3 0.3919 0.2388     
N1   -0.5129 0.0695*   
N23   0.4512 0.21395   
H1   0.2088 0.27445   
H23   1.1561 0.01945**   
N0H     0.6403 0.07875* 
N1H0     -0.8116 0.0329** 
N1H     0.3429 0.25475 
N23H0     12.7699 0.48025 
N23H     -0.7557 0.1097 
SOURCE: Author  *** Significant at the .01 level  **Significant at the .05 level *Significant at the .10 level 
   # Coefficients shown are for a two-tailed test. 
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The AGE variables are not individually significant in any of the three Pre-9/11 
models, but they are jointly significant in each model, indicating that age has an effect on 
retention behavior of Pre-9/11 aviators.  Since AGE is negative and AGE SQUARED is 
positive, it appears that age has a negative but diminishing effect on retention until the 
aviator reaches a certain age, the turning point, after which the effect on retention 
behavior becomes positive as age increases. The turning point for Pre-9/11 aviators is 32 
years of age.  This indicates that as age increases up to 32 years of age, Pre-9/11 aviators 
have a decreasing likelihood of staying.  Once an aviator reaches 32 years of age, the 
likelihood of remaining in the Marine Corps becomes increasingly positive as his age 
increases. 
Most of the marital status and dependency variables are not significant in the Pre-
9/11 models.  The exception is MWC, which has a positive effect on retention, indicating 
that an aviator in the Pre-9/11 period who is married with children is more likely to stay 
than an aviator who is single with no children.  The variables MNC and SWC are not 
significant, indicating that they have no effect on the retention decision of Pre-9/11 
aviators.  MWC may be significant because individuals who are married with dependents 
may have a stronger desire for stable employment situations than others due to the need 
and desire to support a spouse and family. 
The WTI variable is positive and significant in the Pre-9/11 models, indicating 
that individuals possessing the Weapons and Tactics MOS are more likely to stay than 
others.  Those individuals who obtain the Additional MOS as WTIs are the most highly 
trained aviators in the Marine Corps.  The Marine Corps has made a large investment in 
these individuals, and generally rewards these individuals with choice assignments.  As a 
result, individuals with the WTI MOS are more likely to stay in the Marine Corps than 
those who do not have the MOS. 
For the Pre-9/11 Total Deployments Model, the deployment variables are neither 
jointly nor individually significant, with the exception of the variable for two 
deployments (D2).  D2 is significant and has a positive effect on deployments.  The most 
likely explanation for this is the relative stability of the Marine Corps and deployments 
during this period. During this period, deployments were planned far in advance and an 
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individual’s deployment schedule could be anticipated with some certainty.  This ability 
to make future plans may make deployments more palatable to Marine aviators and 
increases their satisfaction with Marine Corps life. 
For the Pre-9/11 Non-Interacted Model, non-hostile and hostile deployments are 
tested independently.  The base case for non-hostile deployments is zero non-hostile 
deployments.  The variable indicating one non-hostile deployment (N1) is negative and 
significant, while multiple non-hostile deployments (N23) are not significant and non-
hostile deployments are not jointly significant.  This is most likely due to the relative 
utility assigned to deployments during this time period when deployments were routine 
and could be planned far in advance.  Aviators in this period had the expectation of 
deploying twice prior to EAOS, and it appears that many looked forward to these two 
opportunities.  Those individuals who only deployed one time had an expectation of two 
deployments, and when this did not occur, these individuals most likely were 
disappointed.  This disappointment may have influenced these aviators to separate.  
Multiple non-hostile deployments are not significant in this model because two 
deployments were the standard, and all aviators expected to deploy two times prior to 
EAOS.  Also, many of those individuals included in this deployment-type variable (N23) 
and have more than two deployments most likely self-selected for any deployment in 
excess of the standard number.   
For the Pre-9/11 Non-Interacted Model, the base case for hostile deployments is 
zero hostile deployments.  The variable indicating one hostile deployment (H1) is not 
statistically significant, while the variable for multiple hostile deployments (H23) is 
positive and significant.  The hostile variables are also jointly significant indicating that 
hostile deployments have an effect on the retention decisions of Pre-9/11 aviators.  The 
significance of the variable H23 indicates that multiple episodes of hostile deployments 
have a positive effect on the retention decision of Marine aviators prior to 9/11.  The 
most probable reason for multiple hostile deployments having a positive effect on 
retention is that hostile deployments occurred relatively infrequently during this period.  
It should be understood that the Marine Corps distinguishes itself from the other services 
with its esprit de corps and will to fight.  Marines are expected to want the opportunity to 
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prove themselves in combat.  Because of this, it is expected that those Marines who have 
seen combat will be more likely to stay than those who have never seen combat.  It 
appears that those individuals who participated in multiple hostile deployments enjoyed 
applying their training in combat situations, which appears to have influenced them to be 
more likely to stay than those who did not participate in any hostile deployments. 
For the Pre-9/11 Interacted Model, only two of the interacted variables are 
individually significant, but the interacted deployment variables are jointly significant.  
The joint significance of the interacted deployment variables indicates that deployments 
affect the retention decisions of Pre-9/11 aviators. The variables that are individually 
significant are zero non-hostile and at least one hostile deployment (N0H) and one non-
hostile and no hostile deployments (N1H0).  Individuals with zero non-hostile and at least 
one hostile deployment are more likely to stay than those aviators with zero deployments.  
This is most likely due to the relative infrequency of hostile deployments during the Pre-
9/11 period.  Also, individuals who participated in hostile deployments during this period 
most likely enjoyed applying their training in combat situations.  During this period, 
combat was rare enough that it left participants with a feeling of satisfaction, which 
appears to have positively affected their retention behavior.   
Aviators in the Pre-9/11 Interacted Model who participated in one non-hostile and 
zero hostile deployments are less likely to stay than aviators who had zero deployments.  
This is most likely due to the relative utility assigned to deployments during this time 
period.  Pre-9/11 aviators had the expectation of deploying twice prior to EAOS, and it is 
likely that many looked forward to these two deployments.  Those individuals who only 
deployed one time had an expectation of two deployments, and when this did not occur, 
these individuals may have been disappointed and this may have negatively influenced 
the retention decision of these aviators. 
3. Partial Effects 
a. Notional Person (Base Case) 
Table 6.5 shows the partial effects of all significant variables in the Pre-
9/11 Sample group.  For the Pre-9/11 Sample group, the notional person has a probability 
of staying of 97.19%.  The notional person in the Pre-9/11 Sample group is 32 years old, 
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white, single with no children, a service academy graduate, not prior enlisted, a Fixed 
Wing Pilot with no deployments, received $30,669 in present value of ACP, and 4,491 
airline pilots were hired the year of his EAOS. 
b. Partial Effects 
The base case for marital status and dependents is single with no children.  
In the Pre-9/11 Total Deployments and Interacted Models, the variable for married with 
children (MWC) is significant and indicates that those who are married with children are 
approximately 12 percentage points more likely to stay than those aviators who are single 
without children.  The WTI MOS has a positive and significant effect on retention.  
Aviators in the WTI MOS have a likelihood of staying of approximately 19 percentage 
points higher than those aviators who do not posses this MOS.   
Finally, only four deployment variables were significant in their effects on 
Pre-9/11 aviators.  In the Non-Interacted Model, the variable H23, multiple hostile 
deployments, has a positive effect on retention.  Pre-9/11 aviators who make multiple 
hostile deployments, have a 17.76 percentage point increase in their likelihood to stay 
over those aviators who have zero hostile deployments.  Also, the variable N1, one non-
hostile deployment, has a negative effect on retention.  Those Pre-9/11 aviators with one 
episode of non-hostile deployment are 7.0 percentage points less likely to stay than 
aviators with zero non-hostile deployments.  
In the Pre-9/11 Interacted Model, the variable N1H0 has a negative and 
significant effect on retention.  An aviator with one non-hostile and zero hostile 
deployments is 9.37 percentage points less likely to stay than an individual who has zero 
deployments.  Also, the variable N0H is positive and significant.  An aviator with zero 
non-hostile and at least one hostile deployment is 13.5 percentage points more likely to 
stay than an aviator with zero deployments. 
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Table 6.5 Partial Effects of Pre-9/11 Deployment Logit Models 
 Partial Effects 
Variables Total Deployments Model Non-Interacted Model Interacted Model 
MWC* +0.12247  +0.11395 
WTI** +0.19663 +0.18795 +0.17806 
N1*  -0.06979  
H23**  +0.17764  
N0H*   +0.13459 
N1H0**   -0.09367 
SOURCE: Author  *** Significant at the .01 level  **Significant at the .05 level *Significant at the .10 level 
 
C. RETENTION OF POST 9/11/2001 (GWOT) MARINE AVIATORS  
1. Model Goodness of Fit 
a. Global Null Hypothesis 
As shown in Table 6.6, the Likelihood Ratios for all three of the GWOT 
models are significant at the .01 level.  Therefore, it can be concluded that at least one of 
the explanatory variables can explain the variation in the dependent variable for each of 
the three GWOT models. 
Table 6.6 Global Null Hypothesis Test for GWOT Logit Models 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA = 0 
Test Likelihood Ratio Chi-Squared DF Pr>ChiSq 
Total Deployments 1429.976 148.8629 19 <.0001 
Non Interacted 1444.527 134.3122 20 <.0001 





As shown in Table 6.7, the Generalized R-Square values are 
approximately 0.11 and the Max-Rescaled R-Square values are approximately 0.15 for 
the GWOT models, indicating that approximately 15% of the variation in the ‘stay’ 
variable is related to the variation in the dependent variables in the models.  Given the 
value of the Max-Rescaled R-Square, it appears that these models have some value in 
explaining the retention behavior of Marine aviators. 
Table 6.7 Generalized R-Square and Max-Rescaled R-Square for the GWOT 
Logit Models 
Model Generalized R-Square Max-Rescaled R-Square 
Total Deployments 0.1139 0.1576 
Non Interacted 0.1034 0.1430 
Interacted 0.1140 0.1577 
SOURCE: Author 
c. Classification Table 
As Table 6.8 shows, these models correctly classify 63.4%, 62.6%, and 
63.0% of the individuals in each of the three GWOT models based upon a probability 
cut-off level of 0.660, which corresponds to the actual proportion of ‘stayers’ among the 
aviators included in the GWOT models.  “Sensitivity” indicates the percentage of the 
‘stayers’ in the sample that are correctly predicted as staying.  As Table 6.8 indicates, 
these models correctly classify 60.2%, 60.6%, and 59.1% of the ‘stayers’ in each of the 
three GWOT models.  “Specificity” indicates the percentage of separators in the sample 
that are correctly predicted as separating.  As Table 6.8 indicates, these models correctly 
classify 69.7%, 66.6%, and 70.4% of those who separated in each of the three GWOT 
models. 
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Table 6.8 Classification Table for the GWOT Logit Models 













0.660 489 292 127 323 63.4 60.2 69.7 20.6 52.5 
Non 
Interacted 
0.660 492 279 140 320 62.6 60.6 66.6 22.2 53.4 
Interacted 0.660 480 295 124 332 63.0 59.1 70.4 20.5 53.0 
SOURCE: Author 
 
2. Interpretation and Evaluation of Coefficients 
Of the 19 variables used in the GWOT Total Deployments Regression Model, 14 
are statistically significant.  Of the 20 variables used in the GWOT Non-Interacted 
Regression Model, 14 are statistically significant.  Of the 21 variables used in the GWOT 
Interacted Regression Model, 16 are statistically significant.  The variables and 
significance levels are shown in Table 6.9.  The results shown are for a one-tailed test, 
with the exception of the FAC variable that uses a two-tailed test. 
Table 6.9 Logit Results for GWOT Aviator Data (N=1,231) 








Age -0.9238 0.0557* -1.0306 0.0361** -0.9056 0.05875* 
Age Squared 0.0122 0.0714* 0.0138 0.0470** 0.0120 0.07495* 
Minority 0.1660 0.28065 0.1629 0.2827 0.1796 0.26495 
Female 0.1851 0.32815 0.1914 0.3212 0.1743 0.3378 
ROTC 0.0825 0.3721 0.0551 0.2135 0.0541 0.8312 
OCS 0.4478 0..0115** 0.4062 0.0192** 0.4220 0.0323** 
Prior_Enl -0.4684 0.07615* -0.4828 0.06955* -0.4890 0.0679* 
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RWP -1.8890 <.0001*** -1.9176 <.0001*** -1.8937 <.0001*** 
NFO -2.1923 <.0001*** -2.2294 <.0001*** -2.1881 <.0001*** 
WTI 0.7408 0.0001*** 0.7759 0.0001*** 0.7419 0.0001*** 
FAC# 0.3125 0.1491 0.3069 0.1547 0.3098 0.1517 
PV_thou 0.0132 <.0001*** 0.0126 <.0001*** 0.0133 <.0001*** 
Hires_thou -0.2547 <.0001*** -0.2532 <.0001*** -0.2563 <.0001*** 
MWC 0.2239 0.07575* 0.2591 0.0953* 0.2301 0.07065* 
MNC 0.1355 0.2417 0.1416 0.4634 0.1210 0.26745 
SWC 1.4714 0.03065** 1.3831 0.0781* 1.4379 0.0338** 
D1 -1.0500 <.0001***     
D2 -0.7727 <.0001***     
D3 -0.8131 <.0001***     
N1   -0.1379 0.1805   
N23   -0.4225 0.0228**   
H1   -0.5026 0.0014***   
H23   -0.3679 0.00975***   
N0H     -0.8731 <.0001*** 
N1H0     -1.0705 0.0002*** 
N1H     -0.7419 0.0003*** 
N23H0     -0.9016 0.0003*** 
N23H     -0.9669 0.0017** 
SOURCE: Author  *** Significant at the .01 level  **Significant at the .05 level *Significant at the .10 level 
   # Coefficients shown are for a two-tailed test. 
 
The AGE and AGE_SQUARED variables are both individually and jointly 
significant in all three GWOT models, indicating that age has an effect on the GWOT 
period aviator’s decision to stay.  Since AGE is negative and AGE SQUARED is positive, 
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it appears that age has a negative but diminishing effect on retention behavior until the 
aviator reaches a certain age, the turning point, after which the effect becomes positive as 
age increases. The turning point for GWOT aviators is 37 years of age.  This indicates 
that as age increases up to 37 years of age, GWOT aviators have a decreasingly negative 
likelihood of staying.  Once an aviator reaches 37 years of age, the likelihood of 
remaining in the Marine Corps increases with age. 
Most of the marital status and dependency variables are significant in the GWOT 
models. The base case is an aviator who is single with no children.  The variable MWC is 
positive and significant in all three models, indicating that an aviator who is married with 
children is more likely to stay than an aviator who is single with no children.  The 
variable SWC is also positive and significant in all three models, indicating that an aviator 
who is a single parent is more likely to stay than an aviator who is single with no 
children.  The variable MNC is not significant in any of the models, indicating that being 
married but not having children does not affect the retention decision. The significance of 
the MWC and SNC variables is most likely because individuals who have dependents are 
more likely to have a stronger desire for stable employment situations than those without 
dependents.  This is most likely due to the need and desire to support a family. 
The commissioning source variables are jointly significant in the GWOT models, 
indicating that commissioning source affects the retention decision of GWOT period 
aviators.  The base case is the variable ACADEMY;  ROTC and OCS graduates are 
compared to ACADEMY graduates.  While ROTC graduates are not significantly different 
from ACADEMY graduates in their retention behavior in the GWOT models, OCS 
graduates show a significantly higher likelihood to stay than ACADEMY graduates.  This 
can be explained by the inclusion of Enlisted Commissioning Programs in this category.  
It was not possible to separate those individuals who participated in Enlisted 
Commissioning Programs from all others who attended Officer Candidate School.  
Therefore, it is likely that the number of prior enlisted Marines affected the results for all 
OCS graduates.   
The PRIOR_ENL variable is positive and significant in all three of the GWOT 
models, indicating that having prior enlisted service has an effect on the retention 
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decision of GWOT period aviators.  The positive and significant effect that having prior 
enlisted service has on an aviator’s retention behavior is most likely due to the matching 
theory.  These aviators have already displayed an affinity for the Marine Corps lifestyle 
indicated by their choosing to transition from the enlisted ranks to the officer ranks and 
thus, increase their service commitment.  Likewise, by selecting these individuals for 
commissioning programs, the Marine Corps has indicated that it is satisfied with their 
performance and wants to continue their employment. 
The type of aviator variables are jointly significant in all three GWOT models, 
indicating that the type of aviator affects retention in the GWOT period.  The base case 
for this variable is FIXED WING PILOTS (FWP), with which ROTARY WING PILOTS 
(RWP) and NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICERS (NFO) are compared.  Both RWP and NFO, 
individually, negatively affect retention in the GWOT period.  This can be explained 
because of the service obligation and time-to-train.  ROTARY WING PILOTS and NAVAL 
FLIGHT OFFICERS incur a six-year obligation upon being designated as naval aviators 
while FIXED WING PILOTS incur an eight-year obligation.  ROTARY WING PILOTS 
and NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICERS undergo two years or less of training, while FIXED 
WING PILOTS undergo more than two years of training.  This difference in time-to-train 
coupled with the length of the service obligation indicates that FIXED WING PILOTS 
will be older and have more time-in-service than other aviators when they make the 
retention decision.  Another explanation is the result of fewer opportunities being 
available to FIXED WING PILOTS in the civilian airline industry during this period when 
compared to the Pre-9/11 period.  Since 9/11, airline pilot hires have decreased while 
furloughs have increased.  For a FIXED WING PILOT who has served 10 years at EAOS, 
the lack of stability of the commercial airline industry most likely forces him to view 
staying in the military as the best available option. 
The WTI variable is positive and significant in the GWOT models, indicating that 
individuals in the Weapons and Tactics MOS are more likely to stay than others.  
Individuals who obtain the Additional MOS as WTIs are the most highly trained aviators 
in the Marine Corps.  The Marine Corps has made a large investment in these individuals, 
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and generally rewards these individuals with choice assignments.  As a result, individuals 
with the WTI MOS are more likely to stay in the Marine Corps than others. 
The present value of the future annual payments of Aviation Continuation Pay 
(PV_THOU) is significant in the GWOT models, indicating that the aviation bonus has a 
positive effect on the retention decision of aviators.  The average present value of ACP 
for the GWOT aviators is $53,796. 
The HIRES_THOU variable is significant and negative in the GWOT models, 
indicating that the number of pilots hired annually by the commercial airline industry has 
a negative effect on the retention decision of Marine Corps aviators in the GWOT period.  
This is most likely due to the benefits associated with employment by the civilian airline 
industry.  The civilian airline industry offers better wages and more flexible schedules 
than the military.  This pay differential and flexibility in scheduling appears to entice 
aviators into separating. 
For the GWOT Total Deployments Model, the deployment variables are all 
negative and are both jointly and individually significant.  This indicates that 
deployments have a negative effect on the retention behavior of GWOT period aviators.  
The base case for this variable is zero deployments (D0).  The deployment variables 
indicate that as the total number of deployments increases, the likelihood of separating 
also increases.  It is most probable that an increase in the total number of deployments 
negatively affects an aviator’s decision to stay due to the perceived hardship of being 
deployed and being separated from family.  In addition, with the Global War on Terror, 
no clear end is in sight.  For those aviators in the GWOT period, the only certainty in 
their future is more frequent deployments.  The increased OPTEMPO of seven months 
deployed followed by seven months at home has caused many individuals to realize that 
during the course of the standard four year tour with their first FMF squadron, they can 
expect to deploy at least three times.  In addition, most, if not all, of these deployments 
can be expected to be to either Iraq or Afghanistan, which place them in harms way.  It 
may be that the expectation of future deployments to these hostile areas has led GWOT 
period aviators to reveal a negative relationship between deployments and retention.  
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For the GWOT Non-Interacted Model, non-hostile and hostile deployments were 
tested independently.  The base case for non-hostile deployments is zero non-hostile 
deployments.  Both of the non-hostile variables, N1 and N23, are negative and 
individually significant indicating that the number of non-hostile deployments has a 
negative effect on the retention decision of Marine aviators in the GWOT period.  The 
most likely explanation for the negative effect of non-hostile deployments is the presence 
of significant stressors related to family separation.  When a Marine is separated from his 
family, he has a certain amount of stress associated with concern for the well being of 
family members left behind, which may have a negative effect on a Marine’s desire to 
deploy.  If a Marine does not want to deploy, even under non-hostile conditions, then he 
may feel that he is incompatible with the Marine Corps life. 
For the GWOT Non-Interacted Model, non-hostile and hostile deployments were 
tested independently.  The base case for non-hostile deployments is zero non-hostile 
deployments.  Both of the non-hostile variables, N1 and N23, are negative and 
individually significant indicating that the number of non-hostile deployments has a 
negative effect on the retention decision of Marine aviators in the GWOT period.  The 
most likely explanation for the negative effect of non-hostile deployments is the presence 
of significant stressors related to family separation.  When a Marine is separated from his 
family, he has a certain amount of stress associated with concern for the well being of 
family members left behind, which may have a negative effect on a Marine’s desire to 
deploy.  If a Marine does not want to deploy, even under non-hostile conditions, then he 
may feel that he is incompatible with the Marine Corps life. 
For the GWOT Interacted Model, all of the interacted variables are individually 
significant as well as jointly significant.  These interacted variables indicate that 
deployments have a negative effect on the Marine aviator’s retention decision.  The base 
case is an individual with zero deployments.  These variables show the negative effect 
that the increased OPTEMPO created by the GWOT has had on the retention of Marine 
Corps aviators.  The strong negative effect of deployments may indicate that GWOT 
period aviators have become exhausted with deploying.  Deployments are more plentiful 
and more frequent in the GWOT period.  This coupled with the decreased retention rate 
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of the period means that fewer individuals are available to carry the increased burden of 
deployments.  With this knowledge, Marines may be more likely to separate than 
continue to deploy in support of the Global War on Terror. 
3. Partial Effects 
a. Notional Person (Base Case) 
Table 6.10 shows the partial effects of all significant variables in the 
GWOT models.  For the GWOT Sample, the notional person has a probability of staying 
of 65.96%.  The notional person in the GWOT Sample group is 33 years old, white, 
single with no children, an service academy graduate, not prior enlisted, a Fixed-Wing 
Pilot with no deployments, received $53,796 in present value of ACP, and 3,121 airline 
pilots were hired the year of his EAOS. 
b. Partial Effects 
The base case for marital status and dependency is an aviator who is single 
with no children.  An aviator who is married with children has a likelihood of staying of 
approximately 7.5 percentage points higher than the notional person.  An aviator who is 
single with children is 19 percentage points more likely to stay than the notional person. 
An aviator who is an OCS graduate is approximately 14 percentage points 
more likely to stay than an ACADEMY graduate.  An aviator who has prior enlisted 
service is 7.5 percentage points more likely to stay than an aviator who has no prior 
enlisted service. 
The base case for the GWOT models is a Fixed Wing Pilot (FWP).  When 
compared to a Fixed Wing Pilot, both Rotary Wing Pilots (RWP) and Naval Flight 
Officers (NFO) are less likely to stay.  RWPs have a likelihood of staying that is 
approximately 25 percentage points less than a FWP.  NFOs have a likelihood of staying 
that is approximately 30 percentage points less than a FWP.  The WTI MOS has a 
positive and significant effect on retention.  Those aviators who possess the WTI MOS 
have a likelihood of staying of approximately 15 percentage points greater than those 
aviators who do not posses this MOS.   
Financial variables also play a role on the retention decision of GWOT 
period aviators.  The likelihood to stay increases by 0.3 percentage points for every 
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$1000 increase in the average Present Value of Aviation Continuation Pay ($53,796).  
Also, for every 1,000 pilots that are hired by the commercial airline industry, a GWOT 
period aviator is 3.7 percentage points less likely to stay than the notional person. 
Finally, nearly all of the deployment variables are significant and have a 
negative effect on the retention decision of GWOT period aviators.  For the GWOT Total 
Deployments Model, those aviators with one deployment have a likelihood of staying 
that is 18.5 percentage points less than an aviator with zero deployments.  Aviators with 
two deployments have a likelihood of staying that is 11.2 percentage points less than 
aviators with zero deployments.  Aviators with more than two deployments have a 
likelihood of staying that is 13.5 percentage points less than those with zero deployments.   
For the GWOT Interacted Model, the base case for non-hostile 
deployments is zero non-hostile deployments, and the base case for hostile deployments 
is zero hostile deployments.  Those aviators with more than one non-hostile deployment 
are 7.1 percentage points less likely to stay than aviators with zero non-hostile 
deployments.  Aviators with one hostile deployment are 8.2 percentage points less likely 
to stay, and those with more than one hostile deployment are 4.6 percentage points less 
likely to stay than aviators with zero hostile deployments. 
For the GWOT Interacted Model, the notional person has zero 
deployments.  Aviators with zero non-hostile and at least one hostile are 13.7 percentage 
points less likely to stay than aviators with zero deployments.  Aviators with one non-
hostile and zero hostile deployments are 22.5 percentage points less likely to stay than the 
notional person.  Aviators with one non-hostile and at least one hostile deployments are 
9.7 percentage points less likely to stay than aviators with zero deployments.  Aviators 
with multiple non-hostile and zero hostile deployments are 18.6 percentage points less 
likely to stay than aviators with zero deployments.  Aviators with multiple non-hostile 
and hostile deployments have a likelihood of staying of 11.7 percentage points less than 
the notional person. 
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Table 6.10 Partial Effects GWOT Deployment Logit Model 
 Partial Effects 
Variables Total Deployments Model Non-Interacted Model Interacted Model 
Age -0.30717* -0.31095** -0.30349* 
OCS +0.14733** +0.14783** +0.13598** 
Prior_Enl +0.07374* +0.08191* +0.07503* 
RWP -0.24141*** -0.26247*** -0.25064*** 
NFO -0.29661*** -0.31660*** -0.30637*** 
WTI +0.14798*** +0.16082*** +0.14101*** 
PV_thou +0.00318*** +0.00321*** +0.00309*** 
Hires_thou -0.03623*** -0.03892*** -0.03672*** 
MWC +0.07870* +0.08563* +0.05198* 
SWC +0.19096** +0.19518* +0.17923** 
D1 -0.18514***   
D2 -0.11206***   
D3 -0.12526***   
N23  -0.07080**  
H1  -0.08172***  
H23  -0.04555***  
N0H   -0.13668*** 
N1H0   -0.22491*** 
N1H   -0.09749*** 
N23H0   -0.18594*** 
N23H   -0.11655**   




D. COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS FROM THE PRE-9/11 AND GWOT 
LOGIT MODELS 
The retention decisions of Marine aviators who were eligible to separate between 
FY1995 and FY2001 (Pre-9/11) and between FY2002 and June 2005 (GWOT) are 
evaluated independently.  A simple comparison of the Pre-9/11 and GWOT deployment 
models shows that the Pre-9/11 models were not as descriptive as the GWOT models; 
only a handful of variables were significant in the Pre-9/11 models, while nearly two-
thirds of the variables were significant in the GWOT models.  Table 6.11 provides a 
comparison of the significance of the variables from the two samples.   
The age and age-squared variables are not significant in the Pre-9/11 model, but 
they are significant in the GWOT model.  This is mostly likely due to the GWOT sub-
sample being older on average than the Pre-9/11 group.  Race is not significant in either 
sub-sample.  The Female variable was not included in the Pre-9/11 model because there 
were no female aviators in that sub-sample.  The marital status and dependency variables 
have mixed results comparatively.  The MWC variable is significant in both groups, and 
MNC is not significant in either group.  But while the SWC variable is not significant in 
the Pre-9/11 group, it is positive and significant in the GWOT group.  
The Prior_Enl and FAC variables are not significant in either sub-sample.  
However, the WTI variable is significant in both groups.  The type of aviator variables are 
not jointly or individually significant in the Pre-9/11 model, but they both individually 
and jointly significant in the GWOT model.  The reason for these variables not being 
significant in the Pre-9/11 model may be the equity in the number of deployments 
between all three types of aviators.  The GWOT period does not have the same equity of 
deployments; rotary wing pilots deploy more frequently than fixed wing pilots. 
Economic factors are not individually significant in the Pre-9/11 model, but they 
are individually significant in the GWOT model.  The present value of ACP is significant 
in the GWOT model most likely because it has been increased and targeted at those 
groups with the lowest retention, namely rotary wing pilots.  The number of pilots hired 
by the airline industry is most likely significant in the GWOT model because many more 
aviators are enticed by the industry.  These Marines view the GWOT as being indefinite 
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in nature, which causes their lives to lack stability.  GWOT period aviators most likely 
view the civilian airline industry as providing more stability compared to the Marine 
Corps.  Because of this, the airline industry is more likely to have an effect on retention 
in the GWOT period than the Pre-9/11 period. 
The majority of the deployment-type variables are not significant in the Pre-9/11 
model; only the variables for one non-hostile deployment (N1), multiple hostile 
deployments (H23), zero non-hostile and at least one hostile deployment (N0H), and one 
non- and zero hostile deployments (N1H0) are significant.  By contrast, in the GWOT 
model, all but one of the deployment-type variables are significant, with the variable for 
one non-hostile deployment (N1) being the only deployment-type variable not significant.  
The reason for the difference in the significance of the deployment variables is most 
likely due to the increased frequency of deployments in the later period.  The aviators in 
the GWOT period have more frequent episodes of deployment and fewer individuals with 
no deployments at EAOS than Pre-9/11 aviators.  As discussed in Chapter III, 30.6% of 
GWOT aviators had more than two deployments compared to only 18.6% of Pre-9/11 
aviators, and only 10.6% of GWOT aviators had zero deployments compared to 15.1% of 
Pre-9/11 aviators.   
The effects of the deployment variables differ from the results of similar studies 
conducted previously, particularly the Hosek and Totten (2002) study.  This thesis sought 
to replicate and update the Hosek and Totten (2002) study.  Hosek and Totten’s (2002) 
approach differs from this thesis primarily with respect to the definition of deployment.  
Hosek and Totten (2002) defined a deployment as occurring when Family Separation 
Allowance or Imminent Danger Pay are received.  While these special pays do indicate 
that the service member was away from home for at least 30-days, they do not indicate 
whether the service member was participating in an OCONUS deployment or a CONUS 
training exercise.  The sociological impact on the service member varies greatly between 
OCONUS deployments and CONUS training exercises, with OCONUS deployments 
having a much greater sociological effect.  This thesis defines deployment as at least 
three consecutive months of Family Separation Allowance or at least two consecutive 
months of Imminent Danger Pay.  This definition is more in line with qualification for the 
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Sea Service Deployment Ribbon, which is generally accepted by Marines as an indicator 
of deployment.  With their broader definition of deployment, Hosek and Totten (2002) 
found that deployments have a positive effect on retention.(Hosek and Totten 2002, i)  
The more precise definition of deployment used in this thesis reveals that prior to 9/11 
deployments did not affect retention unless the number of deployments failed to meet the 
expectations of the Marine or the duty included multiple hostile deployments.  This thesis 
also updates the Hosek and Totten (2002) study, which evaluated retention behavior in 
the 1990s, by showing that since 9/11 deployments have had a negative effect on the 
retention of Marine aviators.   
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   Table 6.11 Comparisons of Variables in the Pre-9/11 and GWOT Logit Models 
Variables Pre-9/11 (N=1,531) GWOT (N=1,231) 
Age NS S 
Age Squared NS S 
Minority NS NS 
Female OMITTED* NS 
ROTC NS NS 
OCS NS S 
Prior_Enl NS S 
RWP NS S 
NFO NS S 
WTI S S 
FAC NS NS 
PV_thou NS S 
Hires_thou NS S 
MWC S S 
MNC NS NS 
SWC NS S 
D1 NS S 
D2 S S 
D3 NS S 
N1 S NS 
N23 NS S 
H1 NS S 
H23 S S 
N0H S S 
N1H0 S S 
N1H NS S 
N23H0 NS S 
N23H NS S 
S = Significant at least at the .10 level NS = Not Significant at least at the .10 level 




E. COMPARISON OF THE PRE-9/11 AND GWOT PARTIAL 
EFFECTS RESULTS 
A comparison of the results of the partial effects for the Pre-9/11 and GWOT 
groups shows dissimilarities between most variables.  The Pre-9/11 models shows only 
six variables being significant, while 21 variables are significant in the GWOT models.   
The variables that are significant in both samples are MWC, WTI, N23, H23, N0H, 
and N1H0.  The MWC and WTI variables are very similar in effect, with both variables 
being positive for both samples.  The MWC variable has 2.8 percentage points more of an 
effect in the Pre-9/11 models than in the GWOT models, and the WTI variable is 4 
percentage points higher in the Pre-9/11 models than in the GWOT models.   The other 
significant variables that are common in both samples are the deployment-type variables 
H23, N0H, and N1H0.  The sign of the effect of multiple deployments (H23) is different 
between the two groups; H23 has an +18 percentage point effect on retention in the Pre-
9/11 model, and a -4.6 percentage point effect on retention in the GWOT model.  The 
effect of the N0H variable also has a different sign in each of the samples.  In the Pre-
9/11 sample, N0H has a +13.46 percentage point effect on retention behavior, while it has 
a -13.67 percentage point effect in the GWOT sample.  The N1H0 variable, however, has 
the same sign in both groups, but differs in magnitude of the effect.  The N1H0 variable 
has a -9.4 percentage point effect on retention in the Pre-9/11 models and a -22.5 




VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis separately evaluated the effects of deployment on the retention of 
Marine aviators before 9/11 and after 9/11.  The factors that affected the retention 
behavior of Marine aviators prior to 9/11/2001 do not appear to be the same as those that 
affect retention behavior after that date.  In particular, the effect of deployments has 
become a significant factor in making the retention decision since the beginning of the 
GWOT.  For the purpose of this thesis, a deployment is defined as having received three 
consecutive months of Family Separation Allowance or two consecutive months of 
Imminent Danger Pay.   
Prior to the 9/11/2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the 
mean retention rate for Marine aviators was 97%.  Since 9/11, the mean retention rate of 
Marine aviators has fallen to 66%.  Prior to 9/11, the Marine Corps deployment cycle 
consisted of six months deployed followed by eighteen months at home.  Since 9/11, the 
deployment cycle consists of seven months deployed followed by seven months at home.  
The increase in OPTEMPO since the beginning of the GWOT indicates that aviators can 
expect to deploy more frequently than they did prior to 9/11.  As noted in Chapter III, 
66% of the GWOT period aviators had two or more deployments prior to EAOS 
compared to only 56.5% of Pre-9/11 period aviators who had this many deployments.  
Similarly, 10.6% of GWOT period aviators had zero deployments prior to EAOS, while 
15.1% of Pre-9/11 aviators had not deployed prior to making the retention decision.  This 
deployment distribution indicates that GWOT period aviators deploy more frequently 
than Pre-9/11 aviators, which leads to the appearance of increased OPTEMPO since the 
beginning of the GWOT.   
Because of the increased OPTEMPO and the increased frequency of deployments, 
it is necessary to evaluate the effects of deployments on Pre-9/11 and GWOT aviators 
separately.  The analysis was conducted using three multivariate logistic regression 
models for each period.  The first model evaluated the effects of the total number of 
deployments on retention behavior utilizing dummy variables for zero deployments, one 
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deployment, two deployments, and more than two deployments.  The second model 
evaluated the effects of non-hostile and hostile deployments independently utilizing 
dummy variables for zero non-hostile deployments, one non-hostile deployment, multiple 
non-hostile deployments, zero hostile deployments, one hostile deployment, and multiple 
hostile deployments.  The third model evaluated the effects of combinations of non-
hostile and hostile deployments on the retention behavior of Pre-9/11 and GWOT period 
aviators. 
The results of the deployment models for the Pre-9/11 period aviators indicate 
that prior to 9/11, deployments had a limited effect on the retention behavior of Marine 
Corps aviators.  The results of the first model indicate that the total number of 
deployments did not affect the retention decision of Pre-9/11 aviators.  The results of the 
second deployment-type model indicate that only indicators for one non-hostile 
deployment and multiple hostile deployments are significant.  For Pre-9/11 aviators, it 
appears that individuals who have only one non-hostile deployment are less likely to stay 
than individuals with zero non-hostile deployments.  Also, individuals with multiple 
hostile deployments appear to be more likely to stay than individuals with zero hostile 
deployments.  These results are extended by the results of the third model.  For the 
combined deployment-type model, indicators of aviators with zero non-hostile and 
multiple hostile deployments (N0H) and one non-hostile and zero hostile deployments 
(N1H0) had significant and positive effects on the retention behavior of Pre-9/11 aviators.  
Pre-9/11 aviators with one non-hostile and zero hostile deployments are less likely to stay 
than aviators with zero deployments.   
The results of the combined deployment-type model are consistent with the 
results of the independent deployment-type model for Pre-9/11 aviators.  Both models 
appear to indicate that aviators with only one non-hostile deployment are relatively less 
likely to stay.  The majority of the aviators in this period experienced two episodes of 
deployment and those aviators who experienced less than two deployments may have 
been dissatisfied with the quantity of deployments they experienced.  This appears to 
have led these aviators to separate.   
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Both models also show that Pre-9/11 aviators responded favorably to hostile 
deployment, particularly multiple episodes of hostile deployment.  The results of these 
models indicate that aviators who had multiple episodes of hostile deployment were more 
likely to stay than Pre-9/11 aviators who had zero episodes of hostile deployment.  This is 
most likely the result of the Marine Corps ethos.  The Marine Corps is recognized for its 
fighting abilities, and Marines hunger for the opportunity to evaluate themselves in 
combat situations.  During this period, combat was rare and experiencing combat may 
have left participants with a feeling of satisfaction which positively affected their 
retention behavior.   
GWOT period aviators appear to have deployed more frequently than Pre-9/11 
aviators.  The results of the analysis reveal that the increased OPTEMPO is negatively 
affecting the retention behavior of GWOT period aviators.  The same three models used 
for the Pre-9/11 period were applied to the GWOT period for comparative analysis.  For 
the GWOT period, nearly all deployment-type indicators are negative and significant.  
The results of the first model indicate that the total number of deployments has a negative 
effect on the retention decision.  The results of the second model indicate that multiple 
non-hostile deployments and any number of hostile deployments have negative effects on 
retention.  GWOT period aviators with multiple non-hostile deployments are less likely 
to stay than aviators with zero non-hostile deployments.  Similarly, GWOT period 
aviators with one hostile deployment or multiple hostile deployments are less likely to 
stay than aviators with zero hostile deployments. 
The third model with interacted variables again indicates that deployments 
negatively affect retention among GWOT period aviators.  GWOT period aviators with 
zero non-hostile and at least one hostile deployment are less likely to stay than aviators 
with zero deployments.  GWOT period aviators with one non-hostile and zero hostile 
deployments are less likely to stay than aviators with zero deployments.  GWOT period 
aviators with one non-hostile and multiple hostile deployments are less likely to stay than 
aviators with zero deployments.  GWOT period aviators with multiple non-hostile and 
zero hostile deployments are less likely to stay than aviators with zero deployments.  
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Finally, GWOT period aviators with multiple non-hostile and multiple hostile 
deployments are less likely to stay than aviators with zero deployments.   
All of the GWOT period deployment models indicate that any episode of 
deployment has a negative effect on the retention behavior of aviators in this period.  This 
is very different than the results form the Pre-9/11 period and is most likely due to the 
effect of the Global War on Terror.  Prior to 9/11, Marine aviators had a deployment 
schedule that was set years in advance.  This schedule was used as a career-planning tool 
for Pre-9/11 aviators.  The Pre-9/11 period was also marked by relative stability in the 
world.  Since 9/11, the deployment schedule is constantly modified and adjusted to meet 
real-time needs and demands.  The GWOT period is also marked by a great deal of 
uncertainty, which revolves around the GWOT itself.  There is no end in sight for the 
GWOT and Marine aviators can expect to continue to deploy at the current OPTEMPO 
indefinitely.  The indefinite nature of the GWOT may have contributed to the lower 
retention rate of GWOT period aviators.   
The results of this thesis differ from results of previous studies, particularly the 
Hosek and Totten (2002) study.  The Hosek and Totten (2002) study determined that 
deployments positively affected the retention decision of first-term enlistees in all four 
services. (Hosek and Totten, 2002, 104).  This thesis reveals that the results of the Hosek 
and Totten (2002) study may not be appropriate for use in the GWOT period.  The 
difference in the results of the two studies can most likely be attributed to the time 
periods observed and the definitions of deployment used by each study.  The Hosek and 
Totten (2002) study evaluated retention behavior in the 1990s and defined retention as 
one or more months of receipt of either Family Separation Allowance or Imminent 
Danger Pay.  This thesis evaluated retention behavior in the GWOT period and defined 
retention as three or more consecutive months of Family Separation Allowance or two or 
more consecutive months of Imminent Danger Pay.  The time period and the more 
specific definition of deployment are the most likely reasons for the difference in results 
revealed by this thesis. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to mitigate the negative GWOT effect on retention, the Marine Corps 
needs to add some stability to its current force.  The Marine Corps should look at its Pre-
9/11 status in order to determine what measures need to be undertaken to remedy the 
retention problem in the aviation community.  These measures should ensure the stability 
of the deployment cycle for both squadrons and individuals.  This will most likely help to 
minimize the effect of the Global War on Terror on the retention behavior of Marine 
Corps aviators. 
This study evaluated the retention decision of Marine aviators from FY1995 
through FY2005.  The focus of the study was the effects related to the GWOT and 
increased OPTEMPO.  A limited amount of data were available to evaluate aviators 
making the retention decision in the GWOT period.  The Marine Corps would be best 
served to continue to evaluate aviators, and all other officer MOS, making the retention 
decision in the GWOT period as more time passes and more data become available.  The 
Marine Corps should also adopt a more accurate definition for deployment, such as the 
one used in this study, for analysts to use when conducting research.  This will enable 
Marine Corps leadership to better understand the research that is being conducted and 
will also allow researchers to produce more accurate and consistent results. 
Based upon the results of this research, it is clear that the Marine Corps must take 
steps in order to counter the decrease in aviator retention.  The following 
recommendations involve individual rotations, career paths, and the service obligation 
and offer some prospect of improving retention in the GWOT period. 
The first recommendation is to base the first Fleet squadron tour on deployments 
rather than years and limit the first tour to two deployments.  Prior to the GWOT, Marine 
aviators expected to deploy twice before being eligible to transfer.  The majority of Pre-
9/11 aviators deployed twice prior to EAOS and their retention rate was 97%.  Since the 
GWOT, Marine aviators are expected to deploy at least three times before becoming 
eligible to transfer.  The majority of GWOT period aviators have more than two 
deployments prior to EAOS and have a retention rate of only 66%.  The increased 
number of deployments of GWOT period aviators creates an added hardship on the 
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aviator and his or her family.  Coupled with the increased OPTEMPO, the GWOT period 
aviator can expect to spend the majority of his or her first three or four years OCONUS, 
and most likely in combat.  This may lead to the exhaustion of many individuals.  In 
order to limit this effect, the Corps should examine limiting the first Fleet tour to two 
deployments.  A two deployment initial tour would align the GWOT period initial 
squadron tour more closely with that of the Pre-9/11 period.  Since deployments had little 
effect on retention behavior prior to 9/11, limiting the number of deployments for GWOT 
period aviators to two may help limit the number of these aviators who choose to 
separate. 
The second recommendation involves aviators who are completing non-Fleet 
tours and preparing to change duty stations.  These individuals should return to deploying 
squadrons immediately following the non-deploying tour.  Individuals in this category 
may include those in non-flying billets as well as those in non-deploying flying billets.  
Individuals in the first category include those attending Resident Professional Military 
Education (PME) or the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Military Officer Instructors 
(MOIs), Officer Selection Officers (OSOs), and those on non-deploying FAC tours.  
Individuals in the second category include pilots from HMX-1, Marine Aviation 
Weapons and Tactics Squadron – 1 (MAWTS-1), flight school, and the various Fleet 
Replacement Squadrons (FRS).  All of these individuals have spent one tour in non-
deploying billets and have been afforded time to rest and recuperate from any previous 
time spent in the Fleet.  These aviators are mentally and physically ready to replace 
aviators in Fleet squadrons in order to afford them the opportunity to rest and recuperate.  
By having these aviators replace those completing their second deployment, the Marine 
Corps will allow itself to maintain the operational readiness levels necessary to be 
combat effective.  This allows for a one-for-one swap of aviators from non-flying billets 
for those returning from their second deployments. 
The third recommendation is to encourage non-traditional career paths for 
aviators.  The current career path for an aviator is to remain in Fleet squadrons as long as 
possible and to return to the Fleet as quickly as possible.  It is highly discouraged for an 
aviator to seek out non-traditional career paths such as attending NPS or becoming an 
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MOI or OSO.  These billets remove the aviator from the cockpit for an extended period 
of time and have historically been frowned upon by the aviation community.  In order to 
allow aviators an opportunity to rest and recover from the current deployment cycle, non-
traditional career paths such as these can become valuable tools.  By encouraging 
alternative career paths, the Marine Corps will be “officially” telling Marine aviators that 
it is acceptable for them to pursue goals outside of the cockpit.  This prevailing negative 
impression of duties outside of the squadron gives young aviators the feeling that 
alternative career paths are career ending.  If this general impression of alternative career 
paths were to change in the aviation community, then more aviators would see that there 
are opportunities outside of the squadron.  GWOT period aviators appear to have a low 
retention rate due to the increased OPTEMPO and uncertain future.  By encouraging 
alternative career paths, the Marine Corps will give these young aviators some certainty 
while also giving them a break from the OPTEMPO.  If afforded the opportunity to 
attend graduate school or participate in MOI or OSO programs armed with the 
knowledge that participating in these programs is not going to be detrimental to career 
progression, it is likely that more aviators will choose to stay in the Marine Corps.  If 
young aviators view alternative career paths as viable options, more may choose to stay 
in the Marine Corps and continue with their aviation careers.   
 The fourth recommendation is to increase the length of the active duty 
service obligation for Rotary Wing Pilots (RWPs) and Naval Flight Officers (NFOs).  
Currently, RWPs and NFOs have a six-year obligation upon completion of flight school, 
while Fixed Wing Pilots (FWPs) have an eight-year obligation.  For FWPs, this eight-
year obligation requires them to stay in the Marine Corps until they reach approximately 
eleven years of service.  At this point, they are “over the hump” and are approaching 
retirement, which acts as an incentive to keep them in the Marine Corps.  RWPs and 
NFOs generally have eight years of service at the decision point.  At eight years of 
service, retirement seems a long way off and is not as large an incentive to stay as it is for 
FWPs at the decision point.  This is shown by the highly negative effect that being either 
an RWP or an NFO has on the retention decision.  The GWOT deployment models show 
that RWPs and NFOs are less likely to stay than FWPs by 25 to 30 percentage points.  
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Because of this, the Marine Corps should take steps aimed at enticing more RWPs and 
NFOs to stay.  Recruiting may be negatively affected by increasing the length of service 
obligations; however, many of the individuals who sign aviation contracts are not 
concerned with the service obligation.  Most individuals who sign aviation contracts prior 
to attending officer training programs have expectations of becoming jet pilots who have 
an eight year commitment.  These individuals will most likely not be affected by an 
increase in the service obligation of Rotary Wing Pilots and Naval Flight Officers; 
therefore, recruiting of aviators is not likely to be negatively affected.  By increasing the 
length of service obligation, not only will the Corps get two extra years of service from 
its RWPs and NFOs, it will also see an added retention benefit because retirement will 
serve as more of an incentive for these aviators to stay.   
The final recommendation involves restructuring Marine squadrons slightly.  This 
recommendation is to pull one squadron per platform from each Marine Aircraft Wing 
(MAW) out of the deployment cycle.  Let these squadrons become an "Advanced FRS" 
where new co-pilots obtain their initial combat qualifications (i.e. Terrain Flight, Night 
Systems, Defensive Maneuvers, and Aerial Gunnery).  Pilots returning from their second 
deployment can rotate into one of these squadrons as instructors in order to obtain relief 
from deploying.  This allows aviators who have been deploying to leave the deployment 
cycle.  It also allows those squadrons in the deployment cycle to focus on the deployment 
rather than on training new aviators in preparation for deployment.  Currently, much of 
the time squadrons spend at home is not actually at home.  Most of this time is spent on 
squadron training exercises ensuring that all of the squadron aviators are fully qualified 
prior to deployment.  Once deployed, the squadron does not have the time or assets 
necessary to train young aviators; it must focus on accomplishing the tasks at hand. By 
installing an “Advanced FRS” with each MAW, the PERSTEMPO for individual aviators 
can be reduced and squadrons can be assured of being fully combat qualified and capable 
of carrying out missions when deployed.  
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